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Abstract
Despite the increasing interest in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in multiple com-
munities, understanding its theoretical foundation has long been recognized as a challenging
problem. In this work, we address this problem by providing a finite-sample analysis for decen-
tralized batch MARL with networked agents. Specifically, we consider two decentralized MARL
settings, where teams of agents are connected by time-varying communication networks, and
either collaborate or compete in a zero-sum game setting, without any central controller. These
settings cover many conventional MARL settings in the literature. For both settings, we develop
batch MARL algorithms that can be implemented in a decentralized fashion, and quantify the
finite-sample errors of the estimated action-value functions. Our error analysis captures how
the function class, the number of samples within each iteration, and the number of iterations
determine the statistical accuracy of the proposed algorithms. Our results, compared to the
finite-sample bounds for single-agent RL, involve additional error terms caused by decentralized
computation, which is inherent in our decentralized MARL setting. This work appears to be the
first finite-sample analysis for batch MARL, which sheds light on understanding both the sample
and computational efficiency of MARL algorithms in general.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has received increasing attention in the reinforce-
ment learning community, with recent advances in both empirical (Foerster et al., 2016; Lowe et al.,
2017; Lanctot et al., 2017) and theoretical studies (Perolat et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2018f,e; Doan et al.,
2019a; Srinivasan et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019). With various models of multi-agent systems,
MARL has been applied to a wide range of domains, including distributed control, telecommuni-
cations, and economics. See Busoniu et al. (2008) for a comprehensive survey on MARL.
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Various settings exist in the literature on multi-agent RL, which are mainly categorized into
three types: the cooperative setting, the competitive setting, and a mix of the two. In par-
ticular, cooperative MARL is usually modeled as either a multi-agent Markov decision process
(MDP) (Boutilier, 1996), or a team Markov game (Wang and Sandholm, 2003), where the agents
are assumed to share a common reward function. A more general while challenging setting
for cooperative MARL considers heterogeneous reward functions for different agents, while the
collective goal is to maximize the average of the long-term return among all agents (Kar et al.,
2013; Zhang et al., 2018f; Suttle et al., 2019). This setting makes it nontrivial to design decen-
tralized MARL algorithms, in which agents make globally optimal decisions using only local
information, without any coordination provided by any central controller. Decentralized pro-
tocol is favored over a centralized one, due to its better scalability, privacy-preserving prop-
erty, and computational efficiency (Kar et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2018f,a). Such a protocol has
been broadly advocated in practical multi-agent systems, including unmanned (aerial) vehicles
(Alexander and Murray, 2004; Zhang et al., 2018b), smart power grid (Zhang et al., 2018c,d), and
robotics (Corke et al., 2005). Several preliminary attempts have been made towards the develop-
ment of MARL algorithms in this setting (Kar et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2018f), with theoretical
guarantees for convergence. However, these theoretical guarantees are essentially asymptotic re-
sults, i.e., the algorithms are shown to converge as the number of iterations increases to infinity.
No analysis has been conducted to quantify the performance of these algorithms with a finite
number of iterations/samples.
Competitive MARL, on the other hand, is usually investigated under the framework ofMarkov
games, especially zero-sumMarkov games. Most existing competitive MARL algorithms typically
concern two-player games (Littman, 1994; Bowling and Veloso, 2002; Perolat et al., 2015), which
can be viewed as a generalization of the standard MDP-based RL model (Littman and Szepesva´ri,
1996). In fact, the decentralized protocol mentioned earlier can be incorporated to generalize such
two-player competitive setting. Specifically, one may consider two teams of cooperative agents
that form a zero-sum Markov game. Within each team, no central controller exists to coordinate
the agents. We note that this generalized setting applies tomany practical examples ofmulti-agent
systems, including two-team-battle video games (Do Nascimento Silva and Chaimowicz, 2017),
robot soccer games (Kitano et al., 1997), and security for cyber-physical systems (Cardenas et al.,
2009). This setting can also be viewed as a special case of the mixed setting, which is usually
modeled as a general-sumMarkov game, and is nontrivial to solve using RL algorithms (Littman,
2001; Zinkevich et al., 2006). This specialization facilitates the non-asymptotic analysis on the
MARL algorithms in the mixed setting.
In general, finite-sample analysis is relatively scarce even for single-agent RL, in contrast to
its empirical studies and asymptotic convergence analysis. One line of work studies the probably
approximately correct (PAC) learnability and sample complexity of RL algorithms (Kakade et al.,
2003; Strehl et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2016). Though built upon solid theoretical foundations, most
algorithms are developed for the tabular-case RL only (Kakade et al., 2003; Strehl et al., 2009), and
are computationally intractable for large-scale RL. Another significant line of work concentrates
on the finite-sample analysis for batch RL algorithms (Munos and Szepesva´ri, 2008; Antos et al.,
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2008a,b; Yang et al., 2018, 2019), using tools from statistical learning theory. Specifically, these
results characterize the errors of output value functions after a finite number of the iterations
using a finite number of samples. These algorithms are built upon value function approximation
and use possibly single trajectory data, which can thus handle massive state-action spaces, and
enjoy the advantages of off-policy exploration (Antos et al., 2008a,b).
Following the batch RL framework, we aim to establish a finite sample analysis for both co-
operative and competitive MARL problems. For both settings, we propose decentralized fitted
Q-iteration algorithms with value function approximation and provide finite-sample analysis.
Specifically, for the cooperative setting where a team of finite agents on a communication network
aims to maximize the global average of the cumulative discounted reward obtained by all the
agents, we establish the statistical error of the action-value function returned by a decentralized
variation of the fitted Q-iteration algorithm, which is measured by the ℓ2-distance between the
estimated action-value function and the optimal one. Interestingly, we show that the statistical
error can be decomposed into a sum of three error terms that reflect the effects of the function
class, number of samples in each fitted Q-iteration, and the number of iterations, respectively.
Similarly, for the competitive MARL where the goal is to achieve the Nash equilibrium of a zero-
sum game played by two teams of networked agents, we propose a decentralized algorithm that
is shown to approximately achieve the desired Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in this case, we also
establish the ℓ2-distance between the action-value function returned by the algorithm and the one
at the Nash equilibrium.
Main Contribution. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we propose batch MARL algorithms for
both the cooperative and competitive settings where the agents are only allowed to communicate
over a network and the reward of each individual agent is observed only by itself. Here, our
formulation of the two-team competitive MARL problem is novel. Our algorithms incorporate
function approximation of the value functions and can be implemented in a decentralized fashion.
Second, most importantly, we provide a finite-sample analysis for these MARL algorithms, which
characterizes the statistical errors of the action-value function returned by our algorithms. Our
error bounds provides a clear characterization of how the function class, the number of samples,
and the number of iterations affect the statistical accuracy of our algorithms. This work appears
to provide the first finite-sample analysis for batch MARL for either cooperative or competitive
settings.
Related Work. The original formulation of MARL traces back to Littman (1994), based on the
framework of Markov games. Since then, various settings of MARL have been advocated. For the
cooperative setting, Boutilier (1996); Lauer and Riedmiller (2000) proposed a multi-agent MDP
model, where all agents are assumed to share identical reward functions. The formulations in
Wang and Sandholm (2003); Mathkar and Borkar (2017) are based on the setting of team Markov
games, which also assume that the agents necessarily have a common reward function. More re-
cently, Kar et al. (2013); Zhang et al. (2018f); Lee et al. (2018); Wai et al. (2018); Chen et al. (2018);
Suttle et al. (2019) advocated the decentralized MARL setting, which allows heterogeneous re-
wards of agents. For the competitive setting, the model of two-player zero-sumMarkov games has
been studied extensively in the literature (Littman, 1994; Bowling and Veloso, 2002; Perolat et al.,
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2015; Yang et al., 2019), which can be readily recovered from the two-team competitive MARL in
the present work. In particular, the recent work Yang et al. (2019) that studies the finite-sample
performance of minimax deep Q-learning for two-player zero-sum games can be viewed as a spe-
cialization of our two-team setting. We note that the most relevant early work that also consid-
ered such a two-team competitive MARL setting was Lagoudakis and Parr (2003), where the value
function was assumed to have a factored structure among agents. As a result, a computationally
efficient algorithm integrated with least-square policy iteration was proposed to learn the good
strategies for a team of agents against the other. However, no theoretical, let alone finite-sample,
analysis was established in the work. Several recent work also investigated the mixed setting with
both cooperative and competitive agents (Foerster et al., 2016; Tampuu et al., 2017; Lowe et al.,
2017), but with focus on empirical instead of theoretical studies. Besides, Chakraborty and Stone
(2014) also considered multi-agent learning with sample complexity analysis under the frame-
work of repeated matrix games.
To lay theoretical foundations for RL, an increasing attention has been paid to finite-sample,
namely, non-asymptotic analysis, of the algorithms. One line of work studies the sample complex-
ity of RL algorithms under the framework of PAC-MDP (Kakade et al., 2003; Strehl et al., 2009;
Jiang et al., 2016), focusing on the efficient exploration of the algorithms. Another more relevant
line of work investigated the finite-sample performance of batch RL algorithms, based on the
tool of approximate dynamic programming for analysis. Munos and Szepesva´ri (2008) studied a
finite-sample bounds for the fitted-value iteration algorithm, followed by Antos et al. (2008b,a)
on fitted-policy iteration and continuous action fitted-Q iteration. Similar ideas and techniques
were also explored in (Scherrer et al., 2015; Farahmand et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2019), for mod-
ified policy iteration, nonparametric function spaces, and deep neural networks, respectively.
Besides, for online RL algorithms, Liu et al. (2015); Dalal et al. (2018); Bhandari et al. (2018);
Srikant and Ying (2019) recently carried out the finite-sample analysis for temporal difference
learning algorithms, and have been extended to the distributed/decentralizedmulti-agent setting
(Doan et al., 2019a,b) concurrently to the preparation of this paper. Complementary to Doan et al.
(2019a,b), our analysis focuses on the batch RL paradigm that is alignedwith (Munos and Szepesva´ri,
2008; Antos et al., 2008b,a; Scherrer et al., 2015). Moreover, our finite-sample results are devel-
oped for control algorithms, while Doan et al. (2019a,b) only analyzed policy evaluation algorithms.
The most relevant analysis for batch MARL was provided by Perolat et al. (2015, 2016), fo-
cusing on the error propagation of the algorithm using also the tool of approximate dynamic
programming. However, no statistical rate was provided in the error analysis, nor the computa-
tional complexity that solves the fitting problem at each iteration. We note that the latter becomes
inevitable in our decentralized setting, since the computation procedure explicitly shows up in
our design of decentralized MARL algorithms. This was not touched upon in the single-agent
analysis (Antos et al., 2008b,a; Scherrer et al., 2015), since they assume the exact solution to the
fitting problem at each iteration can be obtained.
In addition, in the regime of decentralizeddecision-making, decentralizedpartially-observable
MDP (Dec-POMDP) (Oliehoek et al., 2016) is recognized as the most general and powerful model.
Accordingly, some finite-sample analysis based on PAC analysis has been established in the lit-
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erature (Amato and Zilberstein, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2012; Ceren et al., 2016). However, since
Dec-POMDPs are known to be NEXP-complete and thus difficult to solve in general, these Dec-
POMDP solvers are built upon some or all the following requirements: i) a centralized planning
procedure to optimize the policies for all the agents (Amato and Zilberstein, 2009); ii) the avail-
ability of the model or the simulator for the sampling (Amato and Zilberstein, 2009; Banerjee et al.,
2012), or not completely model-free (Ceren et al., 2016); iii) a special structure of the reward
(Amato and Zilberstein, 2009), or the policy-learning process (Banerjee et al., 2012). Also, these
PAC results only apply to the small-scale setting with tabular state-actions and mostly finite time
horizons. In contrast, our analysis is amenable to the batch RL algorithms that utilize function
approximation for the setting with large state-action spaces.
Notation. For a measurable space with domain S , we denote the set of measurable functions on S
that are bounded by V in absolute value by F (S ,V ). Let P (S ) be the set of all probabilitymeasures
on S . For any ν ∈ P (S ) and any measurable function f : S → R, we denote by ‖f ‖ν the ℓ2-norm of
f with respect to measure ν. We use a∨ b to denote max{a,b} for any a,b ∈ R, and define the set
[K] = {1,2, · · · ,K}.
2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the decentralized MARL problem with networked agents, for both
cooperative and competitive settings.
2.1 Decentralized Cooperative MARL
Consider a team of N agents, denoted by N = [N ], that operate in a common environment in a
cooperative fashion. In the decentralized setting, there exists no central controller that is able
to either collect rewards or make the decisions for the agents. Alternatively, to foster the col-
laboration, agents are assumed to be able to exchange information via a possibly time-varying
communication network. We denote the communication network by a graph Gτ = (N ,Eτ), where
the edge set Eτ represents the set of communication links at time τ ∈N. Formally, we define the
following model of networked multi-agent MDP (M-MDP).
Definition 2.1 (Networked Multi-Agent MDP). A networked multi-agent MDP is characterized by a
tuple (S , {Ai }i∈N ,P, {Ri }i∈N , {Gτ}τ≥0,γ ) where S is the global state space shared by all the agents in N ,
andAi is the set of actions that agent i can choose from. Let A =∏Ni=1Ai denote the joint action space of
all agents. Moreover, P : S×A→ P (S ) is the probability distribution of the next state, Ri : S×A→ P (R)
is the distribution of local reward function of agent i, which both depend on the joint actions a and the
global state s, and γ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. S is a compact subset of Rd which can be infinite,
A has finite cardinality A = |A|, and the rewards have absolute values uniformly bounded by Rmax. At
time τ,1 the agents are connected by the communication network Gτ . The states and the joint actions
are globally observable while the rewards are observed only locally.
1Note that this time index τ can be different from the time index t for the M-MDP, e.g., it can be the index of the
algorithms updates. See examples in §3.
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By this definition, agents observe the global state st and perform joint actions at = (a
1
t , . . . ,a
N
t ) ∈
A at time t. In consequence, each agent i receives an instantaneous reward r it that samples from
the distribution Ri(· |st ,at). Moreover, the environment evolves to a new state st+1 according to
the transition probability P(· |st ,at). We refer to this model as a decentralized one because each
agent makes individual decisions based on the local information acquired from the network. In
particular, we assume that given the current state, each agent i chooses actions independently to
each other, following its own policy πi : S → P (Ai). Thus, the joint policy of all agents, denoted
by π : S → P (A), satisfies π(a | s) =∏i∈N πi (ai | s) for any s ∈ S and a ∈ A.
The cooperative goal of the agents is to maximize the global average of the cumulative dis-
counted reward obtained by all agents over the network, which can be formally written as
max
π
1
N
∑
i∈N
E
 ∞∑
t=0
γ t · r it
.
Accordingly, under any joint policy π, the action-value function Qπ : S ×A→R can be defined as
Qπ(s,a) =
1
N
∑
i∈N
Eat∼π(· | st )
[ ∞∑
t=0
γ t · r it
∣∣∣∣∣s0 = s,a0 = a].
Notice that since r it ∈ [−Rmax,Rmax] for any i ∈ N and t ≥ 0, Qπ are bounded by Rmax/(1 − γ ) in
absolute value for any policy π. We let Qmax = Rmax/(1− γ ) for notational convenience. Thus we
have Qπ ∈ F (S ×A,Qmax) for any π. We refer to Qπ as global Q-function hereafter. For notational
convenience, under joint policy π, we define the operator Pπ : F (S ×A,Qmax)→ F (S ×A,Qmax)
and the Bellman operator Tπ : F (S ×A,Qmax)→ F (S ×A,Qmax) that correspond to the globally
averaged reward as follows
(PπQ)(s,a) = Es′∼P(· | s,a),a′∼π(· | s′ )
[
Q(s′ ,a′)
]
, (TπQ)(s,a) = r(s,a) +γ · (PπQ)(s,a), (2.1)
where r(s,a) =
∑
i∈N r i(s,a) ·N−1 denotes the globally averaged reward with r i (s,a) =
∫
rRi(dr |s,a).
Note that the action-value function Qπ is the unique fixed point of Tπ. Similarly, we also define
the optimal Bellman operator corresponding to the averaged reward r as
(T Q)(s,a) = r(s,a) +γ ·Es′∼P(· |s,a)
[
max
a′∈A
Q(s′ ,a′)
]
.
Given a vector of Q-functions Q ∈ [F (S ×A,Qmax)]N with Q = [Qi]i∈N , we also define the average
Bellman operator T˜ : [F (S ×A,Qmax)]N →F (S ×A,Qmax) as
(T˜ Q)(s,a) = 1
N
∑
i∈N
(T iQi )(s,a) with T iQi = r i(s,a) +γ ·Es′∼P(· | s,a)
[
1
N
·
∑
i∈N
max
a′∈A
Qi(s′,a′)
]
. (2.2)
Note that T˜ Q = T Q if Qi =Q for all i ∈ N .
In addition, for any action-value function Q : S ×A → R, one can define the one-step greedy
policy πQ to be the deterministic policy that chooses the action with the largest Q-value, i.e., for
any s ∈ S , it holds that
πQ(a | s) = 1 if a = argmax
a′∈A
Q(s,a′).
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If there are more than one actions a′ that maximize the Q(s,a′), we break the tie randomly. Fur-
thermore, we can define an operator G, which generates the average greedy policy of a vector of
Q-function, i.e., G(Q) =N−1∑i∈N πQi , where πQi denotes the greedy policy with respect to Qi .
2.2 Decentralized Two-Team Competitive MARL
Now, we extend the decentralized cooperative MARLmodel to a competitive setting. In particular,
we consider two teams, referred to as Team 1 and Team 2 that operate in a common environment.
LetN andM be the sets of agents in Team 1 and Team 2, respectively, with |N | =N and |M| =M .
We assume the two teams form a zero-sum Markov game, i.e., the instantaneous rewards of all
agents sum up to zero. Moreover, within each team, the agents can exchange information via a
communication network, and collaborate in a decentralized fashion as defined in §2.1. We give a
formal definition for such a model of networked zero-sum Markov game as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Networked Zero-Sum Markov Game). A networked zero-sum Markov game is char-
acterized by a tuple(
S ,
{
{Ai }i∈N , {Bj }j∈M
}
,P,
{
{R1,i}i∈N , {R2,j}j∈M
}{
{G1τ}τ≥0, {G2τ}τ≥0
}
,γ
)
,
where S is the global state space shared by all the agents inN andM,Ai (resp. Bi) are the sets of actions
for any agent i ∈ N (resp. j ∈ M). Let A =∏i∈N Ai (resp. B =∏j∈MBj) denote the joint action space
of all agents in Team 1 (resp. in Team 2). Moreover, P : S ×A×B → P (S ) is the probability distribution
of the next state, R1,i ,R2,j : S × A × B → P (R) are the distribution of local reward function of agent
i ∈ N and j ∈M, respectively, and γ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Also, the two teams form a zero-sum
Markov game, i.e., at time t,
∑
i∈N r
1,i
t +
∑
j∈M r
2,j
t = 0, with r
1,i
t ∼ R1,i(st ,at ,bt) and r2,jt ∼ R2,j(st ,at ,bt)
for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M. Moreover, S is a compact subset of Rd , both A and B have finite cardinality
A = |A| and B = |B|, and the rewards have absolute values uniformly bounded by Rmax. All the agents
in Team 1 (resp. in Team 2), are connected by the communication network G1τ (resp. G
2
τ) at time τ. The
states and the joint actions are globally observable while the rewards are observed only locally by each
agent.
We note that this model generalizes the most common competitive MARL setting, which is
usually modeled as a two-player zero-sumMarkov game (Littman, 1994; Perolat et al., 2015). Ad-
ditionally, we allow collaboration among agents within the same team, which establishes a mixed
MARL setting with both cooperative and competitive agents. This mixed setting finds broad prac-
tical applications, including team-battle video games (Do Nascimento Silva and Chaimowicz, 2017),
robot soccer games (Kitano et al., 1997), and security for cyber-physical systems (Cardenas et al.,
2009).
For two-team competitive MARL, each team now aims to find the team’s joint policy that
optimizes the average of the cumulative rewards over all agents in that team. With the zero-
sum assumption, this goal can also be viewed as one team, e.g., Team 1, maximizing the globally
averaged return of its agents; whereas the other team (Team 2) minimizing the same globally
averaged return. Accordingly, we refer to Team 1 (resp. Team 2) as themaximizer (resp. minimizer)
7
team, without loss of generality. Let πi : S → P (Ai) and σ j : S → P (Bj ) be the local policies of
agents i ∈ N and j ∈ M, respectively. Then, given any fixed joint policies π = ∏i∈N πi of Team 1
and σ =
∏
j∈Mσ j of Team 2, one can similarly define the action-value functionQπ,σ : S×A×B →R
as
Qπ,σ (s,a,b) =
1
N
∑
i∈N
Eπ(· |st ),σ(· |st )
[ ∞∑
t=0
γ t · r1,it
∣∣∣∣∣s0 = s,a0 = a,b0 = b],
for any (s,a,b) ∈ S ×A×B, where Eπ(· | st),σ(· | st ) means that at ∼ π(· |st) and bt ∼ σ(· |st) for all t ≥ 1.
We also define the value function Vπ,σ : S →R by
Vπ,σ (s) = Ea∼π(· |s),b∼σ(· | s)[Qπ,σ (s,a,b)].
Note that Qπ,σ and Vπ,σ are both bounded by Qmax = Rmax/(1 − γ ) in absolute values, i.e., Qπ,σ ∈
F (S × A × B,Qmax) and Vπ,σ ∈ F (S ,Qmax). Formally, the collective goal of Team 1 is to solve
maxπminσ Vπ,σ . The collective goal of Team 2 is thus to solve minσmaxπVπ,σ . For finite action
spaces A and B, by Minimax theorem (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Patek, 1997), there
exists a minimax value V ∗ ∈ F (S ,Qmax) of the game such that
V ∗ =max
π
min
σ
Vπ,σ =min
σ
max
π
Vπ,σ .
Similarly, one can define theminimaxQ-value of the game asQ∗ =maxπminσQπ,σ =minσmaxπQπ,σ .
We also define the optimal Q-value of Team 1 under policy π as Qπ =minσQπ,σ , where the oppo-
nent Team 2 is assumed to be performing the best (minimizing) response to π.
Moreover, under fixed joint policy (π,σ) of two teams, one can define the operators Pπ,σ ,P
∗ :
F (S ×A×B,Qmax)→F (S ×A×B,Qmax) and the Bellman operators Tπ,σ ,T : F (S ×A×B,Qmax)→
F (S ×A×B,Qmax) by
(Pπ,σQ)(s,a,b) = Es′∼P(· |s,a,b),a′∼π(· | s′),b′∼σ(· | s′)
[
Q(s′ ,a′ ,b′)
]
,
(P∗Q)(s,a,b) = Es′∼P(· |s,a,b)
{
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q(s′,a′ ,b′)
]}
, (2.3)
(Tπ,σQ)(s,a,b) = r1(s,a,b) +γ · (Pπ,σQ)(s,a,b),
(T Q)(s,a,b) = r1(s,a,b) +γ · (P∗Q)(s,a,b),
where r1(s,a,b) =N−1 ·∑i∈N r1,i(s,a,b) denotes the globally averaged reward of Team 1, where we
write r1,i(s,a,b) =
∫
rR1,i(dr |s,a,b). Note that the operators Pπ,σ , P∗, Tπ,µ, and T are all defined
corresponding to the globally averaged reward of Team 1, i.e., r1. One can also define all the
quantities above based on that of Team 2, i.e., r2(s,a,b) =
∑
j∈M r2,j(s,a,b) ·M−1, with the max
and min operators interchanged. Also note that the maxmin problem on the right-hand side of
(2.3), which involves a matrix game given by Q(s′ , ·, ·), may not admit pure-strategy solutions. For
notational brevity, we also define the following two operators Tπ as TπQ = minσ Tπ,σQ, for any
Q ∈ F (S × A × B,Qmax). Moreover, with a slight abuse of notation, we also define the average
8
Bellman operator T˜ : [F (S ×A × B,Qmax)]N → F (S ×A × B,Qmax) for the maximizer team, i.e.,
Team 1, similar to the definition in (2.2) 2:
(T˜ Q)(s,a,b) = r1(s,a,b) +γ ·E
[
1
N
∑
i∈N
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Qi(s′ ,a′ ,b′)
]]
. (2.4)
In addition, in zero-sum Markov games, one can also define the greedy policy or equilibrium
policy of one teamwith respect to a value or action-value function, where the policy acts optimally
based on the best response of the opponent team. Specifically, given any Q ∈ F (S ×A×B,Qmax),
the equilibrium joint policy of Teams 1, denoted by πQ, is defined as
πQ(· |s) = argmax
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q(s,a,b)
]
. (2.5)
With this definition, we can define an operator E1 that generates the average equilibrium policy
with respect to a vector of Q-function for agents in Team 1. Specifically, with Q = [Qi]i∈N , we
define E1(Q) =N−1 ·∑i∈N πQi , where πQi is the equilibrium policy as defined in (2.5).
3 Algorithms
In this section, we introduce the decentralized batch MARL algorithms proposed for both the
cooperative and the competitive settings.
3.1 Decentralized Cooperative MARL
Our decentralized MARL algorithm is an extension of the fitted-Q iteration algorithm for single-
agent RL (Riedmiller, 2005). In particular, all agents in a team have access to a dataset D =
{(st , {ait}i∈N , st+1)}t=1,··· ,T that records the transition of the multi-agent system along the trajectory
under a fixed joint behavior policy. The local reward function, however, is only available to each
agent itself.
At iteration k, each agent i maintains an estimate of the globally averagedQ-function denoted
by Q˜ik . Then, agent i samples local reward {r it }t=1,··· ,T along the trajectory D, and calculates the
local target data {Y it }t=1,··· ,T following Y it = r it +γ ·maxa∈A Q˜ik(st+1,a). With the local data available,
all agents hope to cooperatively find a common estimate of the global Q-function, by solving the
following least-squares fitting problem
min
f ∈H
1
N
∑
i∈N
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
Y it − f (st ,at)
]2
, (3.1)
where H ⊆ F (S × A,Qmax) denotes the function class used for Q-function approximation. The
exact solution to (3.1), denoted by Q˜k+1, can be viewed as an improved estimate of the global
Q-function, which can be used to generate the targets for the next iteration k + 1. However, in
2For convenience, we will write Ea∼π′ ,b∼σ ′
[
Q(s,a,b)
]
as Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q(s,a,b)
]
hereafter.
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practice, since agents have to solve (3.1) in a distributed fashion, then with a finite number of
iterations of any distributed optimization algorithms, the estimate at each agent may not reach
exactly consensual. Instead, each agent i may have an estimate Q˜ik+1 that is different from the exact
solution Q˜k+1. This mismatch will then propagate to next iteration since agents can only use the
local Q˜ik+1 to generate the target for iteration k+1. This is in fact one of the departures of our finite-
sample analysis for MARL from the analysis for the single-agent setting (Munos and Szepesva´ri,
2008; Lazaric et al., 2010). After K iterations, each agent i finds the local greedy policy with
respect to Q˜iK and the local estimate of the global Q-function. To obtain a consistent joint greedy
policy, all agents together output the average of their local greedy policies, i.e., output πK = G(Q˜K ).
The proposed decentralized algorithm for cooperative MARL is summarized in Algorithm 1.
When a parametric function class is considered, we denote H by HΘ , where HΘ = {f (·, ·;θ) ∈
F (S ×A,Qmax) : θ ∈ Rd }. In this case, (3.1) becomes a vector-valued optimization problem with
a separable objective function among the agents. For notational convenience, we let g i(θ) = T −1 ·∑T
t=1
[
Y it − f (st ,at ;θ)
]2
, and thus write (3.1) can be written as
min
θ∈Rd
1
N
∑
i∈N
g i(θ). (3.2)
Since target data are distributed, i.e., each agent i only has access to its own g i(θ), the agents
need to exchange local information over the network Gτ to solve (3.2), which admits a decen-
tralized optimization algorithm. Note that problem (3.2) may be nonconvex with respect to θ
when HΘ is a nonlinear function class, such deep neural networks, which makes computation of
the exact minimum of (3.2) intractable. In addition, even if HΘ is a linear function class, which
turns (3.2) into a convex problem, with only a finite number of steps in practical implementa-
tion, decentralized optimization algorithms can at best converge to a neighborhood of the global
minimizer. Thus, the mismatch between Q˜ik and Q˜k mentioned above is inevitable for our finite
iteration analysis.
There exists a rich family of decentralized or consensus optimization algorithms for networked
agents that can solve the vector-valued optimization problem (3.2). For the setting with a time-
varying communication network, which is a general scenario in decentralized optimization, sev-
eral recent work Nedic et al. (2017); Tatarenko and Touri (2017); Hong and Chang (2017) can ap-
ply. When the overall objective function is strongly-convex, Nedic et al. (2017) is the most ad-
vanced algorithm that is guaranteed to achieve geometric/linear convergence rate to the best of
our knowledge. Thus, we use the DIGing algorithm proposed in Nedic et al. (2017) as a possible
computational algorithm to solve (3.2). In particular, each agent i maintains two vectors in DIG-
ing, i.e., the solution estimate θil ∈ Rd , and the average gradient estimate γ il ∈ Rd , at iteration l.
Each agent exchanges these two vectors with its neighbors over the time-varying network {Gl}l≥0,
weighted by some consensus matrix Cl = [cl(i, j)]N×N that respects the topology of the graph Gl3.
Details on choosing the consensus matrix Cl will be provided in §4. The updates of the DIGing
3Note that here we allow the communication graph to be time-varying even within each iteration k of Algorithm 1.
Thus, we use l as the time index used in the decentralized optimization algorithm instead of τ, the general time index
in Definition 2.1.
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algorithm are summarized in Algorithm 2. If HΘ represents a linear function class, then (3.2)
can be strongly-convex under mild conditions. In this case, one can quantitatively characterize
the mismatch between the global minimizer of (3.2) and the output of Algorithm 2 after a finite
number of iterations, thanks to the linear convergence rate of the algorithm.
For general nonlinear function classHΘ , however, some existing algorithms for nonconvex de-
centralized optimization (Zhu and Martı´nez, 2013; Hong et al., 2016; Tatarenko and Touri, 2017)
can be applied. Nonetheless, in that case, the mismatch between the algorithm output and the
global minimizer is very difficult to quantify, which is a fundamental issue in general nonconvex
optimization problems.
Algorithm 1 Decentralized Fitted Q-Iteration Algorithm for Cooperative MARL
Input: Function class H, trajectory data D =
{(
st , {ait}i∈N , st+1
)}
t=1,··· ,T , number of iterations K ,
number of samples n, the initial estimator vector Q˜0 = [Q˜
i
0]i∈N .
for k = 0,1,2, . . . ,K − 1 do
for agent i ∈ N do
Sample r it ∼ Ri(· |st ,at) and compute local target Y it = r it + γ ·maxa∈A Q˜ik(st+1,a), for all data(
st , {ait}i∈N , st+1
)
∈ D.
end for
Solve (3.1) for all agents i ∈ N , by decentralized optimization algorithms, e.g., by Algorithm
2, if H is a parametric function class HΘ .
Update the estimator Q˜ik+1 for all agents i ∈ N .
end for
Output: The vector of estimator Q˜K = [Q˜
i
K ]i∈N of Q
∗ and joint greedy policy πK = G(Q˜K ).
Algorithm 2 DIGing: A Decentralized Optimization Algorithm for Solving (3.2)
Input: Parametric function class HΘ , stepsize α > 0, initial consensus matrix C0 = [c0(i, j)]N×N ,
local target data {Y it }t=1,··· ,T , initial parameter θi0 ∈ Rd , and initial vector γ i0 = ∇g i
(
θi0
)
for all
agent i ∈ N .
for l = 0,1,2, . . . ,L− 1 do
for agent i ∈ N do
θil+1 =
∑
j∈N cl(i, j) ·θjl −α ·γ il
γ il+1 =
∑
j∈N cl(i, j) ·γ jl +∇g i
(
θil+1
)
−∇g i
(
θil
)
end for
end for
Output: The vector of functions [Q˜i]i∈N with Q˜i = f
(
·, ·;θiL
)
for all agent i ∈ N .
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3.2 Decentralized Two-team Competitive MARL
The proposed algorithm for two-team competitive MARL is also based on the fitted-Q iteration
algorithm. Similarly, agents in both teams receive their rewards following the single trajectory
data in D = {(st , {ait}i∈N , {bjt }j∈M, st+1)}t=1,··· ,T . To avoid repetition, in the sequel, we focus on the
update and analysis for the agents in Team 1. Those for Team 2 can be derived in a similar way.
At iteration k, each agent i ∈ N in Team 1 maintains an estimate Q˜1,ik of the globally averaged
Q-function of its team. With the local reward r1,it ∼ R1,i(st ,at ,bt) available, agent i computes the
target Y it = r
1,i
t + γ ·maxπ′∈P (A)minσ ′∈P (B)Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q˜1,ik (st+1,a,b)
]
. Then, all agents in Team 1 aim to
improve the estimate of the minimax global Q-function by cooperatively solving the following
least-squares fitting problem
min
f 1∈H
1
N
∑
i∈N
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
Y it − f 1(st ,at ,bt)
]2
. (3.3)
Here with a slight abuse of notation, we also useH ⊂ F (S×A×B,Qmax) to denote the function class
for Q-function approximation. Similar to the discussion in §3.1, with decentralized algorithms
that solve (3.3), agents in Team 1 may not reach consensus on the estimate within a finite number
of iterations. Thus, the output of the algorithm at iteration k is a vector of Q-functions, i.e., Q1k =
[Q1,ik ]i∈N , which will be used to compute the target at the next iteration k+1. Thus, the final output
of the algorithm after K iterations is the average greedy policy with respect to the vector Q1K , i.e.,
E1(Q1K ), which can differ from the exact minimizer of (3.3) Q˜1K . The decentralized algorithm for
competitive two-team MARL is summarized in Algorithm 3. Moreover, if the function class H is
parameterized as HΘ , especially as a linear function class, then the mismatch between Q˜1,ik and
Q˜1k after a finite number of iterations of the distributed optimization algorithms, e.g., Algorithm
2, can be quantified. We provide a detailed discussion on this in §4.3.
4 Theoretical Results
In this section, we provide a finite-sample analysis on the algorithms proposed in §3. We first
introduce several common assumptions for both the cooperative and competitive settings.
The function classH used for action-value function approximation greatly influences the per-
formance of the algorithm. Here we use the concept of pseudo-dimension (Munos and Szepesva´ri,
2008; Antos et al., 2008a,b) to capture the capacity of function classes, as assumed below.
Assumption 4.1 (Capacity of Function Classes). Let VH+ denote the pseudo-dimension of a function
class H, i.e., the VC-dimension of the subgraphs of functions in H. Then the function class H used in
both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3 has finite pseudo-dimension, i.e., VH+ <∞.
In our decentralized setting, each agent may not have access to the simulators for the overall
MDP (Markov game) model transition. Thus, the data D have to be collected from an actual
trajectory of the networked M-MDP (or the Markov game), under some joint behavior policy of
all agents. Note that the behavior policy of other agents are not required to be known in order to
generate such a sample path. Our assumption regarding the sample path is as follows.
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Algorithm 3 Decentralized Fitted Q-Iteration Algorithm for Two-team Competitive MARL
Input: Function class H, trajectory data D =
{(
st , {ait}i∈N , {bjt }j∈M, st+1
)}
t=1,··· ,T , number of itera-
tions K , number of samples n, the initial estimator vectors Q˜10 = [Q˜
1,i
0 ]i∈N .
for k = 0,1,2, . . . ,K − 1 do
for agent i ∈ N in Team 1 do
Solve a matrix game
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q˜1,ik (st+1,a,b)
]
to obtain equilibrium policies (π′k ,σ
′
k).
Sample r1,it ∼ R1,i(· |st ,at ,bt) and compute local target
Y it = r
1,i
t +γ ·Eπ′k ,σ ′k
[
Q˜1,ik (st+1,a,b)
]
,
for all data
(
st , {ait}i∈N , {bjt }j∈M, st+1
)
∈ D.
end for
Solve (3.3) for agents in Team 1, by decentralized optimization algorithms, e.g., byAlgorithm
2, if H is a parametric function class HΘ .
Update the estimate Q˜1,ik+1 for all agents i ∈ N in Team 1.
end for
Output: The vector of estimates Q˜1K = [Q˜
1,i
K ]i∈N , and joint equilibrium policy πK = E1(Q˜1K ).
Assumption 4.2 (Sample Path). The sample path used in the cooperative (resp. the competitive team)
setting, i.e., D = {(st , {ait}i∈N , st+1)}t=1,··· ,T (resp. D = {(st , {ait}i∈N , {bjt }j∈M, st+1)}t=1,··· ,T ), are collected
from a sample path of the networked M-MDP (resp. Markov game) under some stochastic behavior
policy. Moreover, the process {(st ,at)} (resp. {(st ,at ,bt)}) is stationary, i.e., (st ,at) ∼ ν ∈ P (S ×A)) (resp.
(st ,at ,bt) ∼ ν ∈ P (S ×A×B)), and exponentially β-mixing4 with a rate defined by (β,g,ζ).
Here we assume a mixing property of the random process along the sample path. Informally,
this means that the future of the process depends weakly on the past, which allows us to derive
tail inequalities for certain empirical processes. Note that Assumption 4.2 is standard in the
literature Antos et al. (2008b); Lazaric et al. (2010) for finite-sample analysis of batch RL using a
single trajectory data. We also note that the mixing coefficients do not need to be known when
implementing the proposed algorithms.
In addition, we also make the following standard assumption on the concentrability coefficient
of the networkedM-MDP and the networked zero-sumMarkov game, as inMunos and Szepesva´ri
(2008); Antos et al. (2008b). The definitions of concentrability coefficients follow from those in
Munos and Szepesva´ri (2008); Perolat et al. (2015). For completeness, we provide the formal def-
initions in Appendix §A.
4See Definition A.1 in Appendix §A on β-mixing and exponentially β-mixing of a stochastic process.
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Assumption 4.3 (Concentrability Coefficient). Let ν be the stationary distribution of the samples
{(st ,at)} (resp. {(st ,at ,bt)}) in D from the networked M-MDP (resp. Markov game) in Assumption 4.2.
Let µ be a fixed distribution on S × A (resp. on S × A × B). We assume that there exist constants
φMDPµ,ν ,φ
MG
µ,ν <∞ such that
(1−γ )2 ·
∑
m≥1
γm−1 ·m ·κMDP(m;µ,ν) ≤ φMDPµ,ν , (4.1)
(1−γ )2 ·
∑
m≥1
γm−1 ·m ·κMG(m;µ,ν) ≤ φMGµ,ν , (4.2)
where κMDP and κMG are concentrability coefficients for the networked M-MDP and zero-sum Markov
game as defined in §A, respectively.
The concentrability coefficient measures the similarity between ν and the distribution of the
future states of the networked M-MDP (or zero-sum Markov game) when starting from µ. The
boundedness of the concentrability coefficient can be interpreted as the controllability of the un-
derlying system, and holds in a great class of regular MDPs and Markov games. See more in-
terpretations on concentrability coefficients in Munos and Szepesva´ri (2008); Perolat et al. (2015);
Chen and Jiang (2019).
As mentioned in §3.1, in practice, at iteration k of Algorithm 1, with a finite number of it-
erations of the decentralized optimization algorithm, the output Q˜ik is different from the exact
minimizer of (3.1). Such mismatches between the output of the decentralized optimization algo-
rithm and the exact solution to the fitting problem (3.3) also exist in Algorithm 3. Thus, we make
the following assumption on this one-step computation error in both cases.
Assumption 4.4 (One-step Decentralized Computation Error). At iteration k of Algorithm 1, the
computation error from solving (3.1) is uniformly bounded, i.e., for each i, there exists a certain ǫik > 0,
such that for any (s,a) ∈ S ×A, it holds that |Q˜ik(s,a) − Q˜k(s,a)| ≤ ǫik , where Q˜k is the exact minimizer
of (3.1) and Q˜ik is the output of the decentralized optimization algorithm at agent i ∈ N . Similarly, at
iteration k of Algorithm 3, there exists certain ǫ1,ik > 0, such that for any (s,a,b) ∈ S×A×B, |Q˜1,ik (s,a,b)−
Q˜1k (s,a,b)| ≤ ǫ1,ik , where Q˜1k is the exact minimizers of (3.3), Q˜1,ik is the output of the decentralized
optimization algorithm at agent i ∈ N .
The computation error, which for example is |Q˜ik(s,a)− Q˜k(s,a)| in the cooperative setting, gen-
erally comes from two sources: 1) the error caused by the finiteness of the number of iterations
of the decentralized optimization algorithm; 2) the error caused by the nonconvexity of (3.2)
with nonlinear parametric function class HΘ . The error is always bounded for function class
H ⊂ F (S ×A,Qmax) with bounded absolute values. Moreover, the error can be further quantified
when HΘ is a linear function class, as to be detailed in §4.3.
4.1 Decentralized Cooperative MARL
Now we are ready to lay out the main results on the finite-sample error bounds for decentralized
cooperative MARL.
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Theorem 4.5 (Finite-sample Bounds for Decentralized Cooperative MARL). Recall that {Q˜k}0≤k≤K
are the estimator vectors generated from Algorithm 1, and πK = G(Q˜K ) is the joint average greedy policy
with respect to the estimate vector Q˜K . Let QπK be the Q-function corresponding to πK , Q
∗ be the
optimal Q-function, and R˜max = (1 + γ )Qmax +Rmax. Also, recall that A = |A|,N = |N |, and T = |D|.
Then, under Assumptions 4.1-4.4, for any fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S × A) and δ ∈ (0,1], there exist
constants K1 and K2 with
K1 = K1
(
VH+ log(T ), log(1/δ), log(R˜max),VH+ log(β)
)
,
K2 = K2
(
VH+ log(T ),VH+ log(β),VH+ log[R˜max(1 +γ )],VH+ log(Qmax),VH+ log(A)
)
,
and ΛT (δ) = K1 +K2 ·N , such that with probability at least 1− δ
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖µ ≤ CMDPµ,ν ·E(H)︸         ︷︷         ︸
Approximation error
+CMDPµ,ν ·
{
ΛT (δ/K)[ΛT (δ/K)/b∨ 1]1/ζ
T /(2048 · R˜4max)
}1/4
︸                                                ︷︷                                                ︸
Estimation error
+
√
2γ ·CMDPµ,ν · ǫ +
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫK︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
Decentralized computation error
+
4
√
2 ·Qmax
(1−γ )2 ·γ
K/2,
where ǫK = [N
−1 ·∑i∈N (ǫiK )2]1/2, and
CMDPµ,ν =
4γ ·
(
φMDPµ,ν
)1/2
√
2(1−γ )2
, E(H) = sup
Q∈HN
inf
f ∈H
‖f − T˜ Q‖ν , ǫ = max
0≤k≤K−1
[
1
N
∑
i∈N
(ǫik)
2
]1/2
.
Moreover, φMDPµ,ν , given in (4.1), is a constant that only depends on the distributions µ and ν.
Proof. The proof is mainly based on the following theorem that quantifies the propagation of
one-step errors as Algorithm 1 proceeds.
Theorem 4.6 (Error Propagation for Decentralized Cooperative MARL). Under Assumptions 4.3
and 4.4, for any fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S ×A), we have
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖µ ≤ CMDPµ,ν · ‖̺‖ν︸        ︷︷        ︸
Statistical error
+
√
2γ ·CMDPµ,ν · ǫ +
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫK︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
Decentralized computation error
+
4
√
2 ·Qmax
(1−γ )2 ·γ
K/2,
where we define
‖̺‖ν = max
k∈[K]
‖T˜ Q˜k−1 − Q˜k‖ν ,
and ǫK ,C
MDP
µ,ν , and ǫ are as defined in Theorem 4.5.
15
Theorem 4.6 shows that both the one-step statistical error and the decentralized computation
error will propagate, which constitute the fundamental error that will not vanish even when the
iteration K → ∞. See §5.1 for the proof of Theorem 4.6. To obtain the main results, now it
suffices to characterize the one-step statistical error ‖̺‖ν . The following theorem establishes a
high probability bound for this statistical error.
Theorem 4.7 (One-step Statistical Error for Decentralized Cooperative MARL). Let Q = [Qi]i∈N ∈
HN be a vector of real-valued random functions (may not be independent from the sample path), let
(st , {ait}i∈N , st+1) be the samples from the trajectory data D and {r it }i∈N be the rewards sampled from
(st , {ait}i∈N , st+1). We also define Y it = r it +γ ·maxa∈AQi (st+1,a), and define f ′ by
f ′ ∈ argmin
f ∈H
1
N
∑
i∈N
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
Y it − f (st ,at)
]2
. (4.3)
Then, under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, for δ ∈ (0,1], T ≥ 1, there exists some ΛT (δ) as defined in
Theorem 4.5, such that with probability at least 1− δ,
‖f ′ − T˜ Q‖2ν ≤ inf
f ∈H
‖f − T˜ Q‖2ν +
√
ΛT (δ)[ΛT (δ)/b∨ 1]1/ζ
T /(2048 · R˜4max)
. (4.4)
The proof of Theorem 4.7 is provided in §5.2. Similar to the existing results in the single-agent
setting (e.g., Lemma 10 in Antos et al. (2008b)), the one-step statistical error consists of two parts,
the approximation error that depends on the richness of the function class H, and the estimation
error that vanishes with the number of samples T .
By replacing Q by Q˜k−1 and f ′ by Q˜k , the results in Theorem 4.7 can characterize the one-
step statistical error ‖T˜ Q˜k−1 − Q˜k‖ν . Together with Theorem 4.6, we conclude the main results in
Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 4.5 establishes a high probability bound on the quality of the output policy πK ob-
tained from Algorithm 1 after K iterations. Here we use the µ-weighted norm of the difference
between Q∗ and QπK as the performance metric. Theorem 4.5 shows that the finite-sample error
of decentralized MARL is precisely controlled by three fundamental terms: 1) the approximation
error that depends on the richness of the function class H, i.e., how well H preserves the average
Bellman operator T˜ ; 2) the estimation error incurred by the fitting step (1), which vanishes with
increasing number of samples T ; 3) the computation error in solving the least-squares problem
(3.1) in a decentralized way with a finite number of updates. Note that the estimation error, after
some simplifications and suppression of constant and logarithmic terms, has the form{
[VH+(N +1)log(T ) +VH+N log(A) + log(K/δ)]1+1/ζ
T
}1/4
. (4.5)
Compared with the existing results in the single-agent setting, e.g., (Antos et al., 2008b, Theorem
4), our results have an additional dependence on O(N log(A)), where N = |N | is the number of
agents in the team and A = |A| is cardinality of the joint action set. This dependence on N is due
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to the fact that the target data used in the fitting step are collections of local target data from
N agents; while the dependence on log(A) characterizes the difficulty of estimating Q-functions,
each of which has A choices to find the maximum given any state s. Similar terms of order log(A)
also show up in the single-agent setting (Antos et al., 2008a,b), which is induced by the capacity
of the action space. In addition, a close examination of the proof shows that the effective dimension
(Antos et al., 2008b) is (N+1)VH+, which is because we allowN agents to have their own estimates
of Q-functions, each of which lies in the function class H with pseudo-dimension VH+ . We note
that it is possible to sharpen the dependence of the rate and the effective dimension on N via
different proof techniques from here, which is left as our future work.
4.2 Two-team Competitive MARL
In the sequel, we establish the finite-sample error bounds for the decentralized competitive MARL
as follows.
Theorem 4.8 (Finite-sample Bounds for Decentralized Two-team Competitive MARL). Recall that
{Q˜1k }0≤k≤K are the estimator vectors obtained by Team 1 via Algorithm 3, and πK = E1(Q˜1K ) is the joint
average equilibrium policy with respect to the estimate vector Q˜1K . Let QπK be the optimal Q-function
corresponding to πK , Q
∗ be the minimax Q-function of the game, and R˜max = (1+γ )Qmax+Rmax. Also,
recall that A = |A|,B = |B|,N = |N |, and T = |D|. Then, under Assumptions 4.1-4.4, for any fixed
distribution µ ∈ P (S ×A×B) and δ ∈ (0,1], there exist constants K1 and K2 with 5
K1 = K1
(
VH+ log(T ), log(1/δ), log(R˜max),VH+ log(β)
)
,
K2 = K2
(
VH+ log(T ),VH+ log(β),VH+ log[R˜max(1 +γ )],VH+ log(Qmax),VH+ log(AB)
)
,
and ΛT (δ) = K1 +K2 ·N , such that with probability at least 1− δ
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖µ ≤ CMGµ,ν ·E(H)︸       ︷︷       ︸
Approximation error
+CMGµ,ν ·
{
ΛT (δ/K)[ΛT (δ/K)/b∨ 1]1/ζ
T /(2048 · R˜4max)
}1/4
︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
Estimation error
+
√
2γ ·CMGµ,ν · ǫ1 +
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫ
1
K︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
Decentralized computation error
+
4
√
2 ·Qmax
(1−γ )2 ·γ
K/2,
where ǫ1K = [N
−1 ·∑i∈N (ǫ1,iK )2]1/2, and
CMGµ,ν =
4γ ·
(
φMGµ,ν
)1/2
√
2(1−γ )2
, E(H) = sup
Q∈HN
inf
f ∈H
‖f − T˜ Q‖ν , ǫ1 = max
0≤k≤K−1
[
1
N
∑
i∈N
(ǫ1,ik )
2
]1/2
.
Moreover, φMGµ,ν , given in (4.2), is a constant that only depends on the distributions µ and ν.
5Note that the constants K1,K2 here may have different values from those in Theorem 4.5.
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Proof. Note that by slightly abusing the notation, the operator T˜ here follows the definition in
(2.4). The proof is established mainly upon the following error propagation bound, whose proof
is provided in §5.3.
Theorem4.9 (Error Propagation for DecentralizedTwo-teamCompetitiveMARL). Under Assump-
tions 4.3 and 4.4, for any fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S ×A×B), we have
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖µ ≤ CMGµ,ν · ‖̺1‖ν︸        ︷︷        ︸
Statistical error
+
√
2γ ·CMGµ,ν · ǫ1 +
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫ
1
K︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
Decentralized computation error
+
4
√
2 ·Qmax
(1−γ )2 ·γ
K/2,
where we define
‖̺1‖ν = max
k∈[K]
‖T˜ Q˜1k−1 − Q˜1k‖ν ,
and ǫ1K ,C
MG
µ,ν , and ǫ
1 are as defined in Theorem 4.8.
Similar to the error propagation results in Theorem 4.6, as iteration K increases, the funda-
mental error of the Q-function under policy πK is bounded by two terms, the statistical error and
the decentralized computation error. The former is characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10 (One-step Statistical Error for Decentralized Two-team Competitive MARL). Let
Q1 = [Q1,i]i∈N ∈ HN be a vector of real-valued random functions (may not be independent from the
sample path), let (st , {ait}i∈N , {bjt }j∈M, st+1) be the samples from the trajectory data D and {r1,it }i∈N be
the rewards sampled by agents in Team 1 from (st , {ait}i∈N , {bjt }j∈M, st+1). We also define Y it = r1,it +
γ ·maxπ′∈P (A)minσ ′∈P (B)Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q1,i(st+1,a,b)
]
, and define f ′ as the minimizer of (4.3). Then, under
Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, for δ ∈ (0,1], T ≥ 1, there exists some ΛT (δ) as defined in Theorem 4.8, such
that the bound that has the form of (4.4) holds.
By substituting the results of Theorem 4.10 into Theorem 4.9, we obtain the desired results
and conclude the proof.
Theorem 4.8 characterizes the quality of the output policy πK for Team 1 obtained from Algo-
rithm 3 in a high probability sense. We use the same performance metric, i.e., the weighted norm
of the difference between QπK and the minimax action-value Q
∗, as in the literature Patek (1997);
Perolat et al. (2015). For brevity, we only include the error bound for Team 1 as in Perolat et al.
(2015), and note that the bound for Team 2 can be obtained immediately by changing the order of
the max and min operators and some notations in the proof.
Similar to the results for the cooperative setting, the error bound is composed of three main
terms, the inherent approximate error depending on the function class H, the estimation error
vanishing with the increasing number of samples, and the decentralized computation error. The
simplified estimation error has a nearly identical form as in (4.5), except that the dependence
on N log(A) is replaced by N log(AB). Moreover, the effective dimension remains (N + 1)VH+
as in (4.5). These observations further substantiate the discussions right after Theorem 4.5, i.e.,
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the dependence on N is due to the local target data distributed at N agents in the team, and the
dependence on log(AB) follows from the capacity of the action space. Also note that the number
of agentsM = |M| in Team 2 does not show up in the bound, thanks to the zero-sum assumption
on the rewards.
4.3 Using Linear Function Approximation
Now we provide more concrete finite-sample bounds for both settings above when a linear func-
tion class for Q-function approximation is used. In particular, we quantify the one-step computa-
tion error bound assumed in Assumption 4.4, after L iterations of the decentralized optimization
algorithm that solves (3.1) or (3.3). We first make the following assumption on the features of the
linear function class used in both settings.
Assumption 4.11. For cooperative MARL, the function class HΘ used in Algorithm 1 is a parametric
linear function class, i.e., HΘ ⊂ F (S ×A,Qmax) and HΘ = {f (s,a;θ) = θ⊤ϕ(s,a) : θ ∈ Rd}, where for
any (s,a) ∈ S ×A, ϕ(s,a) ∈ Rd is the feature vector. Moreover, letMMDP = T −1 ·∑Tt=1ϕ(st ,at)ϕ⊤(st ,at)
with {(st ,at)}t∈[T ] being samples from the data set D, then the matrix MMDP is full rank. Similarly, for
two-team competitive MARL, the function class HΘ ⊂ F (S × A × B,Qmax) used in Algorithm 3 is a
parametric linear function class, with ϕ(s,a,b) ∈Rd being the feature vector for any (s,a,b) ∈ S ×A×B.
Moreover, lettingMMG = T −1 ·∑Tt=1ϕ(st ,at ,bt)ϕ⊤(st ,at ,bt) with {(st ,at ,bt)}t∈[T ] being samples from the
data set D, we have that the matrixMMG is full rank.
Since f ∈ HΘ has bounded absolute value Qmax, Assumption 4.11 implies that the norm of
the features are uniformly bounded. The second assumption on the rank of the matrices MMDP
and MMG ensures that the least-squares problems (3.1) and (3.3) are strongly-convex, which en-
ables theDIGing algorithm to achieve the desirable geometric convergence rate over time-varying
communication networks. We note that this assumption can be readily satisfied in practice. Let
ϕ(s,a) = [ϕ1(s,a), · · · ,ϕd(s,a)]⊤. Then, the functions {ϕ1(s,a), · · · ,ϕd(s,a)} (or vectors of dimension
|S | × |A| if the state space S is finite), are required to be linearly independent, in the conventional
RL with linear function approximation (Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997; Geramifard et al., 2013).
Thus, with a rich enough data set D, it is not difficult to find d ≪ T samples from D, such that
the matrix [ϕ(s1,a1), · · · ,ϕ(sd ,ad )]⊤ has full rank, i.e., rank d. In this case, with some algebra (see
Lemma B.1 in Appendix §B), one can show that the matrix MMDP is also full-rank. The similar
argument applies to the matrix MMG. These arguments justify the rationale behind Assumption
4.11.
Moreover, we make the following assumption on the time-varying consensus matrix Cl used
in the DIGing algorithm (see also Assumption 1 in Nedic et al. (2017)).
Assumption 4.12 (Consensus Matrix Sequence {Cl}). For any l = 0,1, · · · , the consensus matrix Cl =
[cl(i, j)]N×N satisfies the following relations:
1) (Decentralized property) If i , j, and edge (j, i) < El , then cl(i, j) = 0;
2) (Double stochasticity) Cl1 = 1 and 1
⊤Cl = 1⊤;
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3) (Joint spectrum property) There exists a positive integer B such that
χ < 1, where χ = sup
l≥B−1
σmax
{
ClCl−1 · · ·Cl−B+1 −
1
N
11
⊤
}
for all l = 0,1, · · · ,
and σmax(·) denotes the largest singular value of a matrix.
Assumption 4.12 is standard and can be satisfied by many matrix sequences used in decen-
tralized optimization. In specific, condition 1) states the restriction on the physical connectivity
of the network; 2) ensures the convergent vector is consensual for all agents; 3) the connectivity
of the time-varying graph {Gl}l≥0. See more discussions on this assumption in (Nedic et al., 2017,
Section 3).
Now we are ready to present the following corollary on the sample and iteration complexity
of Algorithms 1 and 3, when Algorithm 2 and linear function approximation is used.
Corollary 4.13 (Sample and Iteration Complexity with Linear Function Approximation). Suppose
Assumptions 4.1- 4.4, and 4.11-4.12 hold, and Algorithm 2 is used in the fitting steps (3.1) and (3.3)
for decentralized optimization. Let πK be the output policy of Algorithm 1, then for any δ ∈ (0,1],
ǫ > 0, and fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S×A), there exist integers K,T , and L, where K is linear in log(1/ǫ),
log[1/(1−γ )], and log(Qmax); T is polynomial in 1/ǫ, γ/(1−γ ), 1/R˜max, log(1/δ), log(β), andN log(A);
and L is linear in log(1/ǫ), log[γ/(1−γ )], such that
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖µ ≤ CMDPµ,ν ·E(H) + ǫ
holds with probability at least 1−δ. If πK is the output policy of Team 1 from Algorithm 3, the same ar-
guments also hold for any fixed distribution µ ∈ P (S×A×B), but with T being polynomial inN log(AB)
instead of N log(A), and CMDPµ,ν replaced by C
MG
µ,ν .
Corollary 4.13, whose proof is deferred to §5.5, is established upon Theorems 4.5 and 4.8. It
shows that the proposed Algorithms 1 and 3 are efficient with the aid of Algorithm 2 under some
mild assumptions, in the sense that finite number of samples and iterations, which scale at most
polynomially with the parameters of the problem, are needed to achieve arbitrarily smallQ-value
errors, provided the inherent approximation error is small.
We note that if the full-rank condition in Assumption 4.11 does not hold, the fitting prob-
lems (3.1) and (3.3) are simply convex. Then, over time-varying communication network, it is
also possible to establish convergence rate of O(1/l) using the proximal-gradient consensus al-
gorithm (Hong and Chang, 2017). We will skip the detailed discussion on various decentralized
optimization algorithms since it is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Proofs of the Main Results
In this section, we provide proofs for the main results presented in §4.
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5.1 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Proof. We start our proof by introducing some notations. For any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we define
̺k = T˜ Q˜k−1 − Q˜k , ηk = T Q˜k−1 − T˜ Q˜k−1, (5.1)
where recall that Q˜k is the exact minimizer of the least-squares problem (3.1), and Q˜k = [Q˜
i
k]i∈N
are the output of Q-function estimators at each agent from Algorithm 1, both at iteration k. Also
by definition of T˜ in (2.2), the expression T˜ Q˜k has the form
(T˜ Q˜k)(s,a) = r(s,a) +γ ·Es′∼P(· |s,a)
[
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
max
a′∈A
Q˜ik(s
′ ,a′)
]
.
The term ρk captures the one-step approximation error of the fitting problem (3.1), which is
caused by the finite number of samples used, and the capacity along with the expressive power of
the function classH. The term ηk captures the computational error of the decentralized optimiza-
tion algorithm after a finite number of updates. Also, we denote by πk the average greedy policy
obtained from the estimator vector Q˜k , i.e., πk = G(Q˜k).
The proof mainly contains the following three steps.
Step (i): First, we establish a recursion between the errors of the exact minimizers of (3.1) at
consecutive iterations with respect to the optimalQ-function, i.e., the recursion betweenQ∗−Q˜k+1
and Q∗ − Q˜k. To this end, we first split Q∗ − Q˜k+1 as follows by the definitions of ̺k+1 and ηk+1
Q∗ − Q˜k+1 =Q∗ −
(
T˜ Q˜k − ̺k+1
)
=
(
Q∗ −Tπ∗Q˜k
)
+
(
Tπ∗Q˜k −T Q˜k
)
+ ηk+1 + ̺k+1, (5.2)
where we denote by π∗ the greedy policy with respect to Q∗.
First note that for any s′ ∈ S and a′ ∈ A, maxa′ Q˜k(s′,a′) ≥ Q˜k(s′ ,a′), which yields
(T Q˜k)(s,a) = r(s,a) +γ ·Es′∼P(· | s,a)
[
max
a′
Q˜k(s
′ ,a′)
]
≥ r(s,a) +γ ·Es′∼P(· |s,a),a′∼π∗(· | s′ )
[
Q˜k(s
′,a′)
]
= (Tπ∗Q˜k)(s,a).
Thus, it follows that Tπ∗Q˜k ≤ T Q˜k . Combined with (5.2), we further obtain
Q∗ − Q˜k+1 ≤
(
Q∗ −Tπ∗Q˜k
)
+ ηk+1 + ̺k+1. (5.3)
Similarly, we can establish a lower bound for Q∗ − Q˜k+1 based on Q∗ − Q˜k . Note that
Q∗ − Q˜k+1 =
(
Q∗ −Tπ˜kQ∗
)
+
(
Tπ˜kQ∗ −T Q˜k
)
+ ηk+1 + ̺k+1,
where π˜k is the greedy policy with respect to Q˜k , i.e., T Q˜k = Tπ˜k Q˜k . Since Q∗ = TQ∗ ≥ Tπ˜kQ∗, it
holds that
Q∗ − Q˜k+1 ≥
(
Tπ˜kQ∗ −Tπ˜k Q˜k
)
+ ηk+1 + ̺k+1. (5.4)
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By combining (5.3) and (5.4), we obtain that for any k ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1},(
Tπ˜kQ∗ −Tπ˜kQ˜k
)
+ ηk+1 + ̺k+1 ≤Q∗ − Q˜k+1 ≤
(
Tπ∗Q
∗ −Tπ∗Q˜k
)
+ ηk+1 + ̺k+1. (5.5)
(5.5) shows that one can both upper and lower bound the error Q∗ − Q˜k+1 using terms related to
Q∗ − Q˜k , plus two error terms ηk+1 and ̺k+1 as defined in (5.1). With the definition of Pπ in (2.1),
we can write (5.5) in a more compact form as
γ ·Pπ˜k (Q∗ − Q˜k) + ηk+1 + ̺k+1 ≤Q∗ − Q˜k+1 ≤ γ ·Pπ∗(Q∗ − Q˜k) + ηk+1 + ̺k+1. (5.6)
Note that since Pπ is a linear operator, we can derive the following bounds for multi-step error
propagation.
Lemma 5.1 (Multi-step Error Propagation in Cooperative MARL). For any k,ℓ ∈ {0,1, . . . ,K−1}with
k < ℓ, we have
Q∗ − Q˜ℓ ≥
ℓ−1∑
j=k
γ ℓ−1−j · (Pπ˜ℓ−1 · · · ,Pπ˜j+1)(ηj+1 + ̺j+1) +γ ℓ−k · (Pπ˜ℓ−1 · · · ,Pπ˜k )(Q∗ − Q˜k),
Q∗ − Q˜ℓ ≤
ℓ−1∑
j=k
γ ℓ−1−j · (Pπ∗)ℓ−1−j (ηj+1 + ̺j+1) +γ ℓ−k · (Pπ∗)ℓ−k(Q∗ − Q˜k),
where ̺j+1 and ηj+1 are defined in (5.1), and we use PπPπ′ and (Pπ)
k to denote the composition of
operators.
Proof. By the linearity of the operator Pπ, we can obtain the desired results by applying the in-
equalities in (5.6) multiple times.
The bounds for multi-step error propagation in Lemma 5.1 conclude the first step of our proof.
Step (ii): Step (i) only establishes the propagation of errorQ∗−Q˜k. To evaluate the output of Algo-
rithm 1, we need to further derive the propagation of error Q∗ −Qπk , where Qπk is the Q-function
corresponding to the output joint policy πk from Algorithm 1. The error Q
∗ −Qπk quantifies the
sub-optimality of the output policy πk at iteration k.
By definition of Q∗, we have Q∗ ≥ Qπk and Q∗ = Tπ∗Q∗. Also note Qπk = TπkQπk and T Q˜ik =
Tπ˜ik Q˜
i
k , where we denote the greedy policy with respect to Q˜
i
k by π˜
i
k , i.e., π˜
i
k = πQ˜ik
, for notational
convenience. Hence, it follows that
Q∗ −Qπk = Tπ∗Q∗ −TπkQπk =
(
Tπ∗Q∗ −
1
N
∑
i∈N
Tπ∗Q˜ik
)
+
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
Tπ∗ −Tπ˜ik
)
Q˜ik
+
(
1
N
∑
i∈N
Tπ˜ik Q˜
i
k −TπkQ˜k
)
+
(
Tπk Q˜k −TπkQπk
)
(5.7)
Now we show that the four terms on the right-hand side of (5.7) can be bounded, respectively.
First, by definition of π˜ik , we have
Tπ∗Q˜ik −Tπ˜ik Q˜
i
k = Tπ∗Q˜ik −T Q˜ik ≤ 0, for all i ∈ N . (5.8)
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Moreover, since πk = G(Qk), it holds that for any Q, TπkQ =N−1
∑
i∈N Tπ˜ikQ where π˜
i
k is the greedy
policy with respect to Q˜ik . Then, by definition of the operator Pπ, we have
Tπ∗Q∗ −Tπ∗Q˜ik = γ ·Pπ∗(Q∗ − Q˜ik), Tπ˜ik Q˜
i
k −Tπ˜ikQ˜k = γ ·Pπ˜ik (Q˜
i
k − Q˜k), (5.9)
By substituting (5.8) and (5.9) into (5.7), we obtain
Q∗ −Qπk ≤ γ ·Pπ∗
(
Q∗ − 1
N
∑
i∈N
Q˜ik
)
+γ · 1
N
∑
i∈N
Pπ˜ik
(Q˜ik − Q˜k) +
(
Tπk Q˜k −TπkQπk
)
= γ · (Pπ∗ −Pπk )(Q∗ − Q˜k) +γ ·
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik
−Pπ∗
)
(Q˜ik − Q˜k) +γ ·Pπk (Q∗ −Qπk ).
This further implies
(I −γ ·Pπk )(Q∗ −Qπk ) ≤ γ · (Pπ∗ −Pπk )(Q∗ − Q˜k) +γ ·
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik
−Pπ∗
)
(Q˜ik − Q˜k),
where I is the identity operator. Note that for any policy π, the operator Tπ is γ-contractive. Thus
the operator I −γ ·Pπ is invertible and it follows that
0 ≤Q∗ −Qπk ≤ γ · (I −γ ·Pπk )−1
[
Pπ∗(Q
∗ − Q˜k)−Pπk (Q∗ − Q˜k)
]
+γ · (I −γ ·Pπk )−1
[
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik
−Pπ∗
)
(Q˜ik − Q˜k)
]
. (5.10)
With the expression (Q∗ − Q˜k) on the right-hand side, we can further bound (5.10) by applying
Lemma 5.1. To this end, we first note that for any f1, f2 ∈ F (S ×A,Qmax) such that f1 ≥ f2, it holds
that Pπf1 ≥ Pπf2 by definition of Pπ. Thus, for any k < ℓ, we obtain the following upper and lower
bounds from Lemma 5.1
Pπℓ (Q
∗ − Q˜ℓ) ≥
ℓ−1∑
j=k
γ ℓ−1−j · (PπℓPπ˜ℓ−1 · · ·Pπ˜j+1)(ηj+1 + ̺j+1)
+γ ℓ−k · (PπℓPπ˜ℓ−1 · · ·Pπ˜k )(Q∗ − Q˜k). (5.11)
Pπ∗(Q
∗ − Q˜ℓ) ≤
ℓ−1∑
j=k
γ ℓ−1−j · (Pπ∗)ℓ−j (ηj+1 + ̺j+1) +γ ℓ−k · (Pπ∗)ℓ−k+1(Q∗ − Q˜k). (5.12)
Moreover, we denote the second term on the right-hand side of (5.10) by ξk , i.e.,
ξk = γ · (I −γ ·Pπk )−1
[
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik
−Pπ∗
)
(Q˜ik − Q˜k)
]
.
Note that ξk depends on the accuracy of the output of the decentralized optimization algorithm
at iteration k, i.e., the error Q˜ik − Q˜k , which vanishes with the number of updates of the decentral-
ized optimization algorithm, when the least-squares problem (3.1) is convex. By this definition,
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together with (5.11)- (5.12), we obtain the bound for the error Q∗ −QπK at the final iteration K as
Q∗ −QπK ≤ (I −γ ·PπK )−1
{K−1∑
j=0
γK−j ·
[
(Pπ∗)
K−j − (PπKPπ˜K−1 · · ·Pπ˜j+1)
]
(ηj+1 + ̺j+1)
+γK+1 ·
[
(Pπ∗)
K+1 − (PπKPπ˜K−1 · · ·Pπ˜0)
]
(Q∗ − Q˜0)
}
+ ξK . (5.13)
To simplify the notation, we introduce the coefficients
αj =
(1−γ )γK−j−1
1−γK+1 , for 0 ≤ j ≤ K − 1, and αK =
(1−γ )γK
1−γK+1 . (5.14)
Also, we introduce K +1 linear operators {Lk}Kk=0 that are defined as
Lj =
(1−γ )
2
· (I −γPπK )−1
[
(Pπ∗)
K−j + (PπKPπ˜K−1 · · ·Pπ˜j+1)
]
, for 0 ≤ j ≤ K − 1,
LK =
(1−γ )
2
· (I −γPπK )−1
[
(Pπ∗)
K+1 + (PπKPπ˜K−1 · · ·Pπ˜0)
]
.
Then, by taking the absolute values of both sides of (5.13), we obtain that for any (s,a) ∈ S ×A
∣∣∣Q∗(s,a)−QπK (s,a)∣∣∣ ≤ 2γ(1−γK+1)(1−γ )2 ·
[K−1∑
j=0
αj ·
(
Lj |ηj+1 + ̺j+1|
)
(s,a)
+αK ·
(
LK |Q∗ − Q˜0|
)
(s,a)
]
+ |ξK (s,a)|, (5.15)
where functions Lj |ηj+1 + ̺j+1| and LK |Q∗ − Q˜0| are both defined over S ×A. The upper bound in
(5.15) concludes the second step of the proof.
Step (iii): Now we establish the final step to complete the proof. In particular, we upper bound
the weighted norm ‖Q∗−QπK ‖µ for some probability distribution µ ∈ P (S ×A), based on the point-
wise bound of |Q∗−QπK | from (5.15). For notational simplicity, we define µ(f ) to be the expectation
of f under µ, that is, µ(f ) =
∫
S×A f (s,a)dµ(s,a). By taking square of both sides of (5.15), we obtain∣∣∣Q∗(s,a)−QπK (s,a)∣∣∣2 ≤ 2 · [2γ(1−γK+1)(1−γ )2
]2
·
[K−1∑
j=0
αj ·
(
Lj |ηj+1 + ̺j+1|
)
(s,a)
+αK ·
(
LK |Q∗ − Q˜0|
)
(s,a)
]2
+2 · |ξK (s,a)|2.
Then, by applying Jensen’s inequality twice, we arrive at
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖2µ = µ
(
|Q∗ −QπK |2
)
≤ 2 ·
[
2γ(1−γK+1)
(1−γ )2
]2
·µ
(K−1∑
j=0
αj ·
(
Lj |ηj+1 + ̺j+1|2
)
+αK ·
(
LK |Q∗ − Q˜0|2
))
+2 ·µ
(
|ξK |2
)
, (5.16)
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where we also use the fact that
∑K
j=0αj = 1 and for all j = 0, · · · ,K , the linear operators Lj are
positive and satisfy Lj1 = 1. Since bothQ∗ and Q˜0 are bounded byQmax = Rmax/(1−γ ) in absolute
value, we have
µ
((
LK |Q∗ − Q˜0|
)2) ≤ (2Qmax)2. (5.17)
Also, by definition of the concentrability coefficients κMDP in §A, we have
µ(Lj ) ≤ (1−γ )
∑
m≥0
γmκMDP(m+K − j)ν, (5.18)
where recall that ν is the distribution over S ×A from which the data {(st ,at)}t=1,··· ,T in trajectory
D are sampled. Moreover, we can also bound µ(|ξK |2) by Jensen’s inequality as
µ
(
|ξK |2
)
≤
(
2γ
1−γ
)2
·µ
(
1−γ
2N
· (I −γ ·Pπk )−1
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik
+Pπ∗
)∣∣∣Q˜ik − Q˜k ∣∣∣)2
≤
(
2γ
1−γ
)2
·µ
(
1−γ
2N
· (I −γ ·Pπk )−1
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik
+Pπ∗
)∣∣∣Q˜ik − Q˜k ∣∣∣2). (5.19)
By Assumption 4.4, we can further bound the right-hand side of (5.19) as
µ
(
|ξK |2
)
≤
(
2γ
1−γ
)2
· 1
N
∑
i∈N
∥∥∥Q˜ik − Q˜k∥∥∥2µ≤
(
2γ
1−γ
)2
· 1
N
∑
i∈N
(ǫiK )
2. (5.20)
Therefore, by plugging (5.17), (5.18), and (5.20) into (5.16), we obtain
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖2µ ≤
[
4γ(1−γK+1)√
2(1−γ )2
]2
·
[K−1∑
j=0
(1−γ )2
1−γK+1 ·
∑
m≥0
γm+K−j−1κMDP(m+K − j)
·
∥∥∥ηj+1 + ̺j+1∥∥∥2ν + (1−γ )γK1−γK+1 · (2Qmax)2
]
+
(
2
√
2γ
1−γ
)2
· 1
N
∑
i∈N
(ǫiK )
2. (5.21)
Furthermore, fromAssumption 4.3 and the definition ofφMDPµ,ν , and letting ǫK = [N
−1·∑i∈N (ǫiK )2]1/2,
it follows from (5.21) that
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖2µ ≤
[
4γ(1−γK+1)√
2(1−γ )2
]2
·
[
(1−γ )2
1−γK+1 ·
∑
m≥0
m ·γm ·κMDP(m)
· max
j=0,··· ,K−1
∥∥∥ηj+1 + ̺j+1∥∥∥2ν + (1−γ )γK(2Qmax)21−γK+1
]
+
(
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫK
)2
,
≤
[
4γ(1−γK+1)√
2(1−γ )2
]2
·
[
φMDPµ,ν
1−γK+1 · maxj=0,··· ,K−1
∥∥∥ηj+1 + ̺j+1∥∥∥2ν
+
(1−γ )γK(2Qmax)2
1−γK+1
]
+
(
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫK
)2
.
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This further yields that
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖µ
≤ 4γ(1−γ
K+1)√
2(1−γ )2
·
[(
φMDPµ,ν
)1/2
1−γK+1 · (‖η‖ν + ‖̺‖ν ) +
γK/2
1−γK+1 · (2Qmax)
]
+
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫK ,
≤
4γ ·
(
φMDPµ,ν
)1/2
√
2(1−γ )2
· (‖η‖ν + ‖̺‖ν) +
4
√
2 ·Qmax
(1−γ )2 ·γ
K/2 +
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫK , (5.22)
where we denote by ‖η‖ν = maxj=0,··· ,K−1 ‖ηj+1‖ν and ‖̺‖ν = maxj=0,··· ,K−1 ‖̺j+1‖ν . Recall that ηj+1
is defined as ηj+1 = T Q˜j − T˜ Q˜j , which can be further bounded by the one-step decentralized
computation error from Assumption 4.4. Specifically, we have the following lemma regarding the
difference between T Q˜j and T˜ Q˜j .
Lemma 5.2. Under Assumption 4.4, for any j = 0, · · · ,K − 1, it holds that ‖ηj+1‖ν ≤
√
2γ · ǫj , where
ǫj = [N
−1 ·∑i∈N (ǫij )2]1/2 and ǫij is defined as in Assumption 4.4.
Proof. By definition, we have
|ηj+1(s,a)| =
∣∣∣∣(T Q˜j)(s,a)− (T˜ Q˜j)(s,a)∣∣∣∣
≤ γ · 1
N
∑
i∈N
E
[∣∣∣max
a′∈A
Q˜j (s
′,a′)−max
a′∈A
Q˜ij(s
′ ,a′)
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣s′ ∼ P(· |s,a)].
Now we claim that for any s′ ∈ S∣∣∣max
a′∈A
Q˜j(s
′ ,a′)−max
a′∈A
Q˜ij (s
′ ,a′)
∣∣∣ ≤ (1 +C0) · ǫij , (5.23)
for any constantC0 > 0. Suppose (5.23) does not hold. Then, either maxa′∈A Q˜ij(s
′ ,a′) ≥maxa′∈A Q˜j (s′ ,a′)+
(1+C0)·ǫij ormaxa′∈A Q˜ij (s′,a′) ≤maxa′∈A Q˜j (s′ ,a′)−(1+C0)·ǫij . In the first case, let a′∗ ∈ argmaxa′∈A Q˜ij (s′ ,a′),
then by Assumption 4.4, the values of Q˜j(s
′ , ·) and Q˜ij (s′ , ·) are close at a′∗ up to a small error ǫij , i.e.,
Q˜j (s
′ ,a′∗) ≥ Q˜ij (s′ ,a′∗)− ǫij . This implies that Q˜j (s′ ,a′∗) ≥maxa′∈A Q˜j (s′,a′) +C0 · ǫij , which cannot hold
since maxa′∈A Q˜j (s′ ,a′) ≥ Q˜j (s′ ,a′) for any a′ including a′∗. Similarly, one can show that the second
case cannot occur. Thus, the claim (5.23) is proved. Letting C0 =
√
2− 1, we obtain that
|ηj+1(s,a)|2 ≤ γ2
(
1
N
∑
i∈N
√
2ǫij
)2
≤
(√
2γ
)2 1
N
∑
i∈N
(
ǫij
)2
,
where the second inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Taking expectation over ν, we obtain
the desired bound.
From Lemma 5.2, we can further simplify (5.22) to obtain the desired bound in Theorem 4.6,
which concludes the proof.
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 4.7
Proof. The proof integrates the proof ideas inMunos and Szepesva´ri (2008) andAntos et al. (2008b).
First, for any fixed Q = [Qi]i∈N and f , we define
d(Q)(s,a, s′) = r(s,a) +γ · 1
N
∑
i∈N
max
a′∈A
Qi(s′,a′),
ℓf ,Q(s,a, s
′) = [d(Q)(s,a, s′)− f (s,a)]2,
where r(s,a) = N−1 ·∑i∈N r i(s,a) with r i(s,a) ∼ Ri(s,a). We also define LH = {ℓf ,Q : f ∈ H,Q ∈ HN }.
For convenience, we denote dt(Q) = d(Q)(st ,at , st+1), for any data (st ,at , st+1) drawn from D. Then,
we define L̂T (f ;Q) and L(f ;Q) as
L̂T (f ;Q) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
dt(Q)− f (st ,at)
]2
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
ℓf ,Q(st ,at , st+1),
L(f ;Q) = ‖f − T˜ Q‖2ν +Eν{Var[d1(Q) |s1,a1]}. (5.24)
Obviously L(f ;Q) = E[̂LT (f ;Q)], and argminf ∈H L̂T (f ;Q) is exactly the minimizer of the objective
defined in (4.3). Also, note that the second term on the right-hand side of (5.24) does not depend
on f , thus argminf ∈HL(f ;Q) = argminf ∈H ‖f − T˜ Q‖2ν . Letting f ′ ∈ argminf ∈H L̂T (f ;Q), we have
‖f ′ − T˜ Q‖2ν − inf
f ∈H
‖f − T˜ Q‖2ν = L(f ′;Q)− L̂T (f ′;Q) + L̂T (f ′;Q)− inf
f ∈H
L(f ;Q)
≤ |̂LT (f ′;Q)− L(f ′;Q)|+ inf
f ∈H
L̂T (f ;Q)− inf
f ∈H
L(f ;Q) ≤ 2sup
f ∈H
|̂LT (f ;Q)− L(f ;Q)|,
≤ 2 sup
f ∈H,Q∈HN
|̂LT (f ;Q)− L(f ;Q)| = 2 sup
ℓf ,Q∈LH
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
ℓf ,Q(Zt)−E[ℓf ,Q(Z1)]
∣∣∣∣∣, (5.25)
where we use the definition of f ′ and ℓf ,Q, and let Zt = (st , {ait}i∈N , st+1) for notational convenience.
In addition, we define two constants C1 and C2 as
C1 = 16 · eN+1(VH+ +1)N+1ANVH+Q(N+1)VH+max
[
64 · eR˜max(1 +γ )
](N+1)VH+
, (5.26)
and C2 = 1/(2048 · R˜4max), and also define ΛT (δ) and ǫ as
ΛT (δ) =
V
2
log(T ) + log
(
e
δ
)
+ log+(C1C
V /2
2 ∨ β), ǫ =
√
ΛT (δ)[ΛT (δ)/b∨ 1]1/ζ
C2T
, (5.27)
where V = (N +1)VH+ and log+(x) = max{log(x),0}. Let
P0 =P
(
sup
ℓf ,Q∈LH
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
ℓf ,Q(Zt)−E[ℓf ,Q(Z1)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ǫ2
)
. (5.28)
Then, from (5.25), it suffices to show P0 < δ in order to conclude the proof. To this end, we use the
technique in Antos et al. (2008b) that splits the T samples inD into 2mT blocks that come in pairs,
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with each block having kT samples, i.e., T = 2mT kT . Then, we can introduce the “ghost” samples
that have mT blocks, H1, · · · ,H2, · · · ,HmT , where each block has the same marginal distribution
as the every second blocks in D, but these new mT blocks are independent of one another. We
let H =
⋃mT
i=1Hi . Recall that R˜max = (1 + γ )Qmax + Rmax, then for any f ∈ H and Q ∈ HN , ℓf ,Q
has absolute value bounded by R˜2max. Thus, we can apply an extended version of Pollard’s tail
inequality to β-mixing sequences (Lemma 5 in Antos et al. (2008b)), to obtain that
P
(
sup
ℓf ,Q∈LH
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
ℓf ,Q(Zt)−E[ℓf ,Q(Z1)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ǫ2
)
≤ 16 ·E
[
N1(ǫ/16,LH, (Z ′t ; t ∈H))
]
e
−mT2 · ǫ
2
(16R˜2max)
2 +2mTβkT , (5.29)
where βm denotes the m-th β-mixing coefficient of the sequence Z1, · · · ,ZT in D (see Definition
A.1), andN1(ǫ/16,LH, (Z ′t ; t ∈H)) is the empirical covering number (see Definition A.4) of the func-
tion class LH evaluated on the ghost samples (Z ′t ; t ∈H).
To bound the empirical covering number N1(ǫ/16,LH, (Z ′t ; t ∈ H)), we establish the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Let Z1:T = (Z1, · · · ,ZT ), with Zt = (st , {ait}i∈N , st+1). Recall that R˜max = (1+γ )Qmax+Rmax,
and A = |A| is the cardinality of the joint action set. Then, under Assumption 4.1, it holds that
N1(ǫ,LH,Z1:T ) ≤ eN+1(VH+ +1)N+1ANVH+Q(N+1)VH+max
(
4eR˜max(1 +γ )
ǫ
)(N+1)VH+
.
Proof. For any lf ,Q and lf˜ ,Q˜ in LH, the empirical ℓ1-distance between them can be bounded as
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣lf ,Q(Zt)− lf˜ ,Q˜(Zt)∣∣∣ ≤ 1T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣dt(Q)− f (st ,at)∣∣∣2 − ∣∣∣dt(Q˜)− f˜ (st ,at)∣∣∣2∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2R˜max
T
T∑
t=1
[∣∣∣f (st ,at)− f˜ (st ,at)∣∣∣+ γN ∑
i∈N
∣∣∣max
a′∈A
Qi(st+1,a
′)−max
a′∈A
Q˜i(st+1,a
′)
∣∣∣]
= 2R˜max
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣f (st ,at)− f˜ (st ,at)∣∣∣+ γT
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣ 1N ∑
i∈N
max
a′∈A
Qi (st+1,a
′)
− 1
N
∑
i∈N
max
a′∈A
Q˜i(st+1,a
′)
∣∣∣∣]. (5.30)
Let DZ = [(s1, {ai1}i∈N ), · · · , (sT , {aiT }i∈N )] and yZ = (s2, · · · , sT+1). Then, the first term in the bracket
of (5.30) is the DZ-based ℓ1-distance of functions in H, while the second term is the yZ -based
ℓ1-distance of functions in the setH∨N = {V : V (·) =N−1 ·
∑
i∈N maxa′∈AQi(·,a′) and Q ∈ HN } (times
γ ). This implies that
N1
(
2R˜max(1 +γ )ǫ,LH,Z1:T
)
≤N1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) · N1(ǫ,H,DZ ). (5.31)
The first empirical covering numberN1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) can be further bounded by the following lemma,
whose proof is deferred to §B.
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Lemma 5.4. For any fixed yZ = (y1, · · · ,yT ), let Dy = {(yt ,aj )}t∈[T ],j∈[A], where recall that A = |A| and
A = {a1, · · · ,aA}. Then, under Assumption 4.1, it holds that
N1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) ≤
[
N1(ǫ/A,H,Dy )
]N ≤ [e(VH+ +1)(2eQmaxAǫ
)VH+ ]N
.
In addition, the second empirical covering number N1(ǫ,H,DZ ) in (5.31) can be bounded di-
rectly by Corollary 3 in Haussler (1995) (see also Proposition B.2 in §B). Combinedwith the bound
from Lemma 5.4, we finally obtain
N1
(
2R˜max(1 +γ )ǫ,LH,Z1:T
)
≤
[
e(VH+ +1)
(
2eQmaxA
ǫ
)VH+ ]N
·
[
e(VH+ +1)
(
2eQmax
ǫ
)VH+ ]
= eN+1(VH+ +1)N+1ANVH+Q
(N+1)VH+
max
(
2e
ǫ
)(N+1)VH+
. (5.32)
Replacing 2R˜max(1+γ )ǫ by ǫ in (5.32), we arrive at the desired bound and complete the proof.
By Lemma 5.3, we can boundN1(ǫ/16,LH, (Z ′t ; t ∈H)) in (5.29) as
N1(ǫ/16,LH, (Z ′t ; t ∈H))
≤ eN+1(VH+ +1)N+1ANVH+Q(N+1)VH+max
[
64eR˜max(1 +γ )
ǫ
](N+1)VH+
=
C1
16
(
1
ǫ
)V
,
where V = (N +1)VH+ and C1 = C1(VH+ ,Qmax, R˜max,γ ) is as defined in (5.26).
Now we are ready to bound the probability P0 in (5.29), based on the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5 (Antos et al. (2008b), Lemma 14). Recall that the parameters (β,g,ζ) define the rate of the
exponential β-mixing sequence Z1, · · · ,ZT in D. Let βm ≤ β exp(−gmζ), T ≥ 1, kT = ⌈(C2Tǫ2/b)
1
1+ζ ⌉,
mT = T /(2KT ), δ ∈ (0,1], V ≥ 2, and C1,C2,β,g,ζ > 0. Further, with ǫ and ΛT defined in (5.27),
C1
(
1
ǫ
)V
e−4C2mT ǫ
2
+2mTβkT < δ.
In particular, let C2 = [8(16R˜
2
max)
2]−1 = (2048R˜4max)−1, we obtain that P0 < δ by applying
Lemma 5.5 onto the right-hand side of (5.29). Note that
ΛT = V /2log(T ) + log(e/δ) +max
{
log(C1) +V /2log(C2), log(β),0
}
= K1 +K2 ·N,
where
K1 = K1
(
VH+ log(T ), log(1/δ), log(R˜max),VH+ log(β)
)
,
K2 = K2
(
VH+ log(T ),VH+ log(β),VH+ log[R˜max(1 +γ )],VH+ log(Qmax),VH+ log(A)
)
,
are some constants that depend on the parameters in the brackets. This yields the desired bound
and completes the proof.
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 4.9
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.6. For brevity, we will only emphasize the
the difference between them. We first define two quantities ̺1k and η
1
k as follows
̺1k = T˜ Q˜1k−1 − Q˜1k , η1k = T Q˜1k−1 − T˜ Q˜1k−1, (5.33)
where recall that at iteration k, Q˜1k is the exact minimizer of the least-squares problem (3.3) among
f 1 ∈ H, and Q˜1k = [Q˜1,ik ]i∈N are the output of Q-function estimators at all agents in Team 1 from
Algorithm 3. Recall from (2.4) that T˜ Q˜1k here has the form
(T˜ Q˜1k )(s,a,b) = r(s,a,b) +γ ·Es′∼P(· | s,a,b)
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′,σ ′
[
Q˜1,ik (s
′,a′ ,b′)
]]
.
The term ρ1k captures the approximation error of the first fitting problem in (3.3), which can be
characterized using tools from nonparametric regression. The term η1k , on the other hand, cap-
tures the computational error of the decentralized optimization algorithm after a finite number of
updates. Also, we denote by πk the average equilibrium policy obtained from the estimator vector
Q˜1k , i.e., πk = E1(Q˜k). For notational convenience, we also introduce the following notations for
several different minimizer policies, σ˜ ik, σ˜
i,∗
k , σ˜k , σ˜
∗
k , σ
∗
k , σ̂
i
k , and σk , which satisfy
T Q˜1,ik = Tπ˜ikQ˜
1,i
k = Tπ˜ik ,σ˜ ikQ˜
1,i
k , Tπ∗Q˜1,ik = Tπ∗,σ i,∗k Q˜
1,i
k , T Q˜1k = Tπ˜k Q˜1k = Tπ˜k ,σ˜k Q˜1k (5.34)
Tπ˜kQ∗ = Tπ˜k ,σ˜ ∗kQ∗, Tπ∗Q˜1k = Tπ∗,σ ∗k Q˜1k , Tπ˜ik Q˜
1
k = Tπ˜ik ,σ̂ ik Q˜
1
k , TπkQπk = Tπk ,σkQπk .
We also separate the proof into three main steps, similar to the procedure in the proof of
Theorem 4.6.
Step (i): The first step is to establish a recursion between the errors of the exact minimizers of the
least-squares problem (3.3) with respect to Q∗, the minimax Q-function of the game. The error
Q∗ − Q˜1k+1 can be written as
Q∗ − Q˜1k+1 =
(
Q∗ −Tπ∗Q˜1k
)
+
(
Tπ∗Q˜1k −T Q˜1k
)
+ η1k+1 + ̺
1
k+1, (5.35)
where we denote by π∗ the equilibrium policy with respect to Q∗. Then, by definition of Tπ∗ and
T in zero-sum Markov games, we have Tπ∗Q˜1k ≤ T Q˜1k . Also, from (5.34) and by relation between
Tπ,σ and Pπ,σ for any (π,σ), it holds that
Q∗ −Tπ∗Q˜1k = Tπ∗Q∗ −Tπ∗Q˜1k = Tπ∗,σ ∗Q∗ −Tπ∗,σ ∗k Q˜1k ≤ Tπ∗,σ ∗kQ∗ −Tπ∗,σ ∗k Q˜1k .
Thus, (5.35) can be upper bounded by
Q∗ − Q˜1k+1 ≤ Tπ∗,σ ∗k (Q
∗ − Q˜1k ) + η1k+1 + ̺1k+1. (5.36)
Moreover, we can also establish a lower bound for Q∗ − Q˜1k+1. Note that
Q∗ − Q˜1k+1 =
(
Q∗ −Tπ˜kQ∗
)
+
(
Tπ˜kQ∗ −T Q˜1k
)
+ η1k+1 + ̺
1
k+1,
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where π˜k is the maxmin policy with respect to Q˜
1
k . Since Q
∗ = TQ∗ ≥ Tπ˜kQ∗ and Tπ˜kQ∗ − Tπ˜k Q˜1k =
Tπ˜k ,σ˜ ∗kQ∗ −Tπ˜k ,σ˜k Q˜1k ≥ Tπ˜k ,σ˜ ∗kQ∗ −Tπ˜k ,σ˜ ∗k Q˜1k , it follows that
Q∗ − Q˜1k+1 ≥ Tπ˜k ,σ˜ ∗k (Q∗ − Q˜1k ) + η1k+1 + ̺1k+1. (5.37)
Thus, from the notations in (5.34), combining (5.36) and (5.37) yields
γ ·Pπ˜k ,σ˜ ∗k (Q∗ − Q˜1k ) + η1k+1 + ̺1k+1 ≤Q∗ − Q˜1k+1 ≤ γ ·Pπ∗,σ ∗k (Q∗ − Q˜1k ) + η1k+1 + ̺1k+1, (5.38)
from which we obtain the following multi-step error propagation bound and conclude the first
step of our proof.
Lemma 5.6 (Multi-step Error Propagation in Competitive MARL). For any k,ℓ ∈ {0,1, . . . ,K − 1}
with k < ℓ, we have
Q∗ − Q˜1ℓ ≥
ℓ−1∑
j=k
γ ℓ−1−j · (Pπ˜ℓ−1,σ˜ ∗ℓ−1Pπ˜ℓ−2,σ˜ ∗ℓ−2 · · ·Pπ˜j+1,σ˜ ∗j+1)(η1j+1 + ̺1j+1)
+γ ℓ−k · (Pπ˜ℓ−1,σ˜ ∗ℓ−1Pπ˜ℓ−2,σ˜ ∗ℓ−2 · · ·Pπ˜k ,σ˜ ∗k )(Q∗ − Q˜1k ),
Q∗ − Q˜1ℓ ≤
ℓ−1∑
j=k
γ ℓ−1−j · (Pπ∗,σ ∗ℓ−1Pπ∗,σ ∗ℓ−2 · · ·Pπ∗,σ ∗j+1)(η
1
j+1 + ̺
1
j+1)
+γ ℓ−k · (Pπ∗,σ ∗ℓ−1Pπ∗,σ ∗ℓ−2 · · ·Pπ∗,σ ∗k )(Q∗ − Q˜1k ),
where ̺1j+1 and η
1
j+1 are defined in (5.33), and we use Pπ,σPπ′,σ ′ to denote the composition of operators.
Proof. By the linearity of the operator Pπ,σ , we can obtain the desired results by applying the
inequalities in (5.38) multiple times.
Step (ii): Now we quantify the sub-optimality of the output policy at iteration k of Algorithm
3 for Team 1, i.e., the error Q∗ −Qπk . Note that Qπk here represents the action-value when the
maximizer Team 1 plays πk and the minimizer Team 2 plays the optimal counter-policy against
πk . As argued in Perolat et al. (2015), this is a natural measure of the quality of the policy πk . The
error Q∗ −Qπk can be separated as
Q∗ −Qπk = T Q∗ −TπkQπk =
(
Tπ∗Q∗ −
1
N
∑
i∈N
Tπ∗Q˜1,ik
)
+
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
Tπ∗ −Tπ˜ik
)
Q˜1,ik
+
(
1
N
∑
i∈N
Tπ˜ikQ˜
1,i
k −Tπk Q˜1k
)
+
(
Tπk Q˜1k −TπkQπk
)
. (5.39)
Now we bound the four terms on the right-hand side of (5.39) as follows. First, by definition of
π˜ik , we have
Tπ∗Q˜1,ik −Tπ˜ikQ˜
1,i
k = Tπ∗Q˜1,ik −T Q˜1,ik ≤ 0, for all i ∈ N . (5.40)
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Moreover, since πk = E1(Qk), by definition, TπkQ = N−1
∑
i∈N Tπ˜ikQ for any Q, where π˜
i
k is the
equilibrium policy of Team 1 with respect to Q˜ik . Thus, we have from (5.34) that
Tπ∗Q∗ −Tπ∗Q˜1,ik ≤γ ·Pπ∗,σ i,∗k (Q
∗ − Q˜1,ik ), Tπ˜ik Q˜
1,i
k −Tπ˜ikQ˜
1
k ≤ γ ·Pπ˜ik ,σ̂ ik (Q˜
1,i
k − Q˜1k ), (5.41)
Tπk Q˜1k −TπkQπk ≤ γ ·Pπk ,σk (Q˜1k −Qπk ), (5.42)
where the inequalities follow from the fact that Tπ∗Q∗ ≤ Tπ∗,σQ∗, Tπ˜ik Q˜
1,i
k ≤ Tπ˜ik ,σQ˜
1,i
k , and Tπk Q˜1k ≤
Tπk ,σQ˜1k for any σ ∈ P (B).
By substituting (5.40), (5.41), and (5.42) into (5.39), we obtain
Q∗ −Qπk ≤
γ
N
∑
i∈N
Pπ∗,σ i,∗k
(Q∗ − Q˜1,ik ) +
γ
N
∑
i∈N
Pπ˜ik ,σ̂
i
k
(Q˜1,ik − Q˜1k ) +γ ·Pπk ,σk (Q˜1k −Qπk )
=
γ
N
∑
i∈N
(Pπ∗,σ i,∗k
−Pπk ,σk )(Q∗ − Q˜1k ) +γ ·Pπk ,σk (Q∗ −Qπk )
+
γ
N
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik ,σ̂
i
k
−Pπ∗,σ i,∗k
)
(Q˜1,ik − Q˜1k ).
Since I −γ ·Pπk ,σk is invertible, we further obtain
0 ≤Q∗ −Qπk ≤
γ
N
· (I −γ ·Pπk ,σk )−1 ·
∑
i∈N
(Pπ∗,σ i,∗k
−Pπk ,σk )(Q∗ − Q˜1k )
+
γ
N
· (I −γ ·Pπk ,σk )−1 ·
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik ,σ̂
i
k
−Pπ∗,σ i,∗k
)
(Q˜1,ik − Q˜1k ). (5.43)
Moreover, by setting ℓ = K and k = 0 in Lemma 5.6, we obtain that for any i ∈ N
γ · (Pπ∗,σ i,∗K −PπK ,σK )(Q
∗ − Q˜1K )
≤
K−1∑
j=0
γK−j ·
[
(Pπ∗,σ i,∗K
Pπ∗,σ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ∗,σ ∗j+1)− (PπK ,σKPπ˜K−1,σ˜ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ˜j+1,σ˜ ∗j+1)
]
· (η1j+1 + ̺1j+1) +γK+1 ·
[
(Pπ∗,σ i,∗K
Pπ∗,σ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ∗,σ ∗0)
− (PπK ,σKPπ˜K−1,σ˜ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ˜0,σ˜ ∗0)
]
(Q∗ − Q˜10). (5.44)
Also, we denote the second term on the right-hand side of (5.43) by ξ1k , i.e.,
ξ1k =
γ
N
· (I −γ ·Pπk ,σk )−1 ·
∑
i∈N
(
Pπ˜ik ,σ̂
i
k
−Pπ∗,σ i,∗k
)
(Q˜1,ik − Q˜1k ), (5.45)
which depends on the quality of the solution to (3.3) returned by the decentralized optimization
algorithm. By combining (5.44) and (5.45), we obtain the bound of (5.43) at the final iteration K
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as
Q∗ −QπK ≤
(I −γ ·PπK ,σK )−1
N
·
∑
i∈N
{K−1∑
j=0
γK−j ·
[
(Pπ∗,σ i,∗K
Pπ∗,σ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ∗,σ ∗j+1)
− (PπK ,σKPπ˜K−1,σ˜ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ˜j+1,σ˜ ∗j+1)
]
(η1j+1 + ̺
1
j+1)
+γK+1 ·
[
(Pπ∗,σ i,∗K
Pπ∗,σ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ∗,σ ∗0)− (PπK ,σKPπ˜K−1,σ˜ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ˜0,σ˜ ∗0)
]
· (Q∗ − Q˜10)
}
+ ξ1K . (5.46)
For simplicity, we define the coefficients {αj }Kk=0 as in (5.14), and linear operators {L1k }Kk=0 as
L1j =
(1−γ )
2N
· (I −γ ·Pπk ,σk )−1
∑
i∈N
[
(Pπ∗,σ i,∗K
Pπ∗,σ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ∗,σ ∗j+1)
+ (PπK ,σKPπ˜K−1,σ˜ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ˜j+1,σ˜ ∗j+1)
]
, for 0 ≤ j ≤ K − 1,
L1K =
(1−γ )
2N
· (I −γ ·Pπk ,σk )−1
∑
i∈N
[
(Pπ∗,σ i,∗K
Pπ∗,σ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ∗,σ ∗0)
+ (PπK ,σKPπ˜K−1,σ˜ ∗K−1 · · ·Pπ˜0,σ˜ ∗0)
]
.
Then, we take absolute value on both sides of (5.46) to obtain∣∣∣Q∗(s,a,b)−QπK (s,a,b)∣∣∣ ≤ 2γ(1−γK+1)(1−γ )2 ·
[K−1∑
j=0
αj ·
(
L1j |η1j+1 + ̺1j+1|
)
(s,a,b)
+αK ·
(
L1K |Q∗ − Q˜0|
)
(s,a,b)
]
+ |ξ1K (s,a,b)|, (5.47)
for any (s,a,b) ∈ S ×A×B. This completes the second step of the proof.
Step (iii): We note that (5.47) has almost the identical form as (5.15), with the fact that
∑K
j=0αj =
1 and for all j = 0, · · · ,K , the linear operators L1j are positive and satisfy L1j 1 = 1. Hence, the
proof here follows directly from the Step (iii) in §5.1, from which we obtain that for any fixed
µ ∈ P (S ×A×B)
‖Q∗ −QπK ‖µ
≤
4γ ·
(
φMGµ,ν
)1/2
√
2(1−γ )2
· (‖η1‖ν + ‖̺1‖ν ) +
4
√
2 ·Qmax
(1−γ )2 ·γ
K/2 +
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫ
1
K , (5.48)
where we denote by ‖η1‖ν = maxj=0,··· ,K−1 ‖η1j+1‖ν , ‖̺1‖ν = maxj=0,··· ,K−1 ‖̺1j+1‖ν , and ǫ1K = [N−1 ·∑
i∈N (ǫ
1,i
K )
2]1/2, with ǫ1,iK being the one-step decentralized computation error from Assumption
4.3. To obtain (5.48), we use the definition of concentrability coefficients κMG and Assumption
4.3, similarly as the usage of the definition of κMDP and Assumption 4.3 in the Step (iii) in §5.1.
Recall that η1j+1 is defined as η
1
j+1 = T Q˜1j −T˜ Q˜1j , which can also be further bounded by the one-
step decentralized computation error from Assumption 4.4. The following lemma characterizes
such a relationship, playing the similar role as Lemma 5.2.
33
Lemma 5.7. Under Assumption 4.4, for any j = 0, · · · ,K − 1, it holds that ‖η1j+1‖ν ≤
√
2γ · ǫ1j , where
ǫ1j = [N
−1 ·∑i∈N (ǫ1,ij )2]1/2 and ǫ1,ij is defined as in Assumption 4.4.
Proof. Note that
|η1j+1(s,a,b)| =
∣∣∣∣(T Q˜1j )(s,a,b)− (T˜ Q˜1j )(s,a,b)∣∣∣∣
≤ γ · 1
N
∑
i∈N
Es′∼P(· | s,a,b)
[∣∣∣∣ max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q˜1j (s
′ ,a′ ,b′)
]
− max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q˜1,ij (s
′ ,a′ ,b′)
]∣∣∣∣].
Now we claim that for any s′ ∈ S∣∣∣∣ max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q˜1j (s
′ ,a′ ,b′)
]
− max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q˜1,ij (s
′ ,a′ ,b′)
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ C1 · ǫ1,ij , (5.49)
for any constantC1 > 1. For notational simplicity, let gj (π
′ ,σ ′) = Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q˜1j (s
′ ,a′ ,b′)
]
and g ij (π
′ ,σ ′) =
Eπ′ ,σ ′
[
Q˜1,ij (s
′ ,a′ ,b′)
]
. Suppose (5.49) does not hold, then either
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
gj (π
′ ,σ ′) ≥ max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
g ij (π
′ ,σ ′) +C1 · ǫij , (5.50)
or
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
gj (π
′ ,σ ′) ≤ max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
g ij (π
′ ,σ ′)−C1 · ǫij .
In the first case, let (π′∗,σ ′∗ ) be the minimax strategy pair for g ij (π
′ ,σ ′), such that g ij (π
′∗,σ ′∗ ) =
maxπ′∈P (A)minσ ′∈P (B) gj (π′ ,σ ′). Note that σ ′∗ = σ ′∗(π′∗) ∈ argminσ ′∈P (B) gj (π′∗,σ ′) is a function of π′∗.
By Assumption 4.4, Q˜1j (s
′ , ·, ·) and Q˜1,ij (s′ , ·, ·) are close to each other uniformly overA×B. Thus, by
the linearity of gj and g
i
j , we have gj (π
′∗,σ ′∗ ) ≥ g ij (π′∗,σ ′∗ )− ǫ1,ij . Together with (5.50), we obtain
gj (π
′∗,σ ′∗ ) ≥ max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
g ij (π
′ ,σ ′) + (C1 − 1) · ǫ1,ij . (5.51)
However, (5.51) cannot hold with any C1 > 1 since maxπ′∈P (A)minσ ′∈P (B) g ij (π
′ ,σ ′) should be no
smaller than gj (π,σ) with any (π,σ) pair that satisfies σ = σ(π) ∈ argminσ∈P (B) gj (π,σ), including
gj (π
′∗,σ ′∗ ). Similarly, one can show that the second case cannot occur. Thus, the claim (5.49) is
proved. Letting C1 =
√
2, we obtain that
|η1j+1(s,a)|2 ≤ γ2
(
1
N
∑
i∈N
√
2ǫ1,ij
)2
≤
(√
2γ
)2 1
N
∑
i∈N
(
ǫ1,ij
)2
,
where the second inequality follows Jensen’s inequality. Taking expectation over ν, we obtain the
desired bound.
From Lemma 5.7, we can further simplify (5.48) to obtain the desired bound in Theorem 4.9,
which concludes the proof.
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5.4 Proof of Theorem 4.10
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.7 in §5.2. To avoid repetition, we will only
emphasize the difference from there. First for any fixed Q = [Qi]i∈N ∈ HN and f ∈ H, we define
ℓf ,Q as
ℓf ,Q(s,a,b, s
′) =
{
r(s,a,b) +γ/N ·
∑
i∈N
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Q
i(s′ ,a′ ,b′)]− f (s,a,b)
}2
,
where r(s,a,b) = N−1 · ∑i∈N r i (s,a,b) with r i (s,a,b) ∼ Ri(s,a,b). Thus, we can similarly define
L̂T (f ;Q) = T
−1 ·∑Tt=1 ℓf ,Q(st ,at ,bt , st+1) and L(f ;Q) = E[̂LT (f ;Q)]. Let f ′ ∈ argminf ∈H L̂T (f ;Q) and
Zt = (st , {ait}i∈N , {bjt }j∈M, st+1), we have
‖f ′ − T˜ Q‖2ν − inf
f ∈H
‖f − T˜ Q‖2ν ≤ 2 sup
ℓf ,Q∈LH
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
ℓf ,Q(Zt)−E[ℓf ,Q(Z1)]
∣∣∣∣∣. (5.52)
Now it suffices to show that the P0 as defined in (5.28) satisfies P0 < δ. Wewill identify the choice of
C1 and C2 in ΛT (δ) shortly. To show P0 < δ, from (5.29), we need to bound the empirical covering
numberN1(ǫ/16,LH, (Z ′t ; t ∈H)), where H is the set of ghost samples. The bound is characterized
by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8. Let Z1:T = (Z1, · · · ,ZT ), with Zt = (st , {ait}i∈N , {bjt }j∈M, st+1). Recall that R˜max = (1 +
γ )Qmax +Rmax, and A = |A|,B = |B|. Then, under Assumption 4.1, it holds that
N1(ǫ,LH,Z1:T ) ≤ eN+1(VH+ +1)N+1(AB)NVH+Q(N+1)VH+max
(
4eR˜max(1 +γ )
ǫ
)(N+1)VH+
.
Proof. We first bound the empirical ℓ1-distance between any lf ,Q and lf˜ ,Q˜ in LH as
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣lf ,Q(Zt)− lf˜ ,Q˜(Zt)∣∣∣ ≤ 2R˜max{ 1T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣f (st ,at ,bt)− f˜ (st ,at ,bt)∣∣∣+ γT
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣ 1N ∑
i∈N
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Q
i(st+1,a
′ ,b′)]− 1
N
∑
i∈N
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Q˜
i(st+1,a
′ ,b′)]
∣∣∣∣}. (5.53)
Let DZ = {(s1, {ai1}i∈N , {b
j
1}j∈M), · · · , (sT , {aiT }i∈N , {b
j
T }j∈M)} and yZ = (s2, · · · , sT+1), then from (5.53),
the empirical covering numberN1
(
2R˜max(1 +γ )ǫ,LH,Z1:T
)
can be bounded by
N1
(
2R˜max(1 +γ )ǫ,LH,Z1:T
)
≤N1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) · N1(ǫ,H,DZ ), (5.54)
where H∨N here is defined as
H∨N =
{
V : V (·) =N−1 ·
∑
i∈N
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Q
i(·,a′ ,b′)] and Q ∈ HN
}
.
We further bound the first covering number N1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) by the following lemma, which is
proved later in §B.
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Lemma 5.9. For any fixed yZ = (y1, · · · ,yT ), let Dy = {(yt ,aj ,bk)}t∈[T ],j∈[A],k∈[B], where recall that A =
|A|,B = |B|, and A = {a1, · · · ,aA},B = {b1, · · · ,bB}. Then, under Assumption 4.1, it holds that
N1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) ≤
[
N1(ǫ/(AB),H,Dy )
]N ≤ [e(VH+ +1)(2eQmaxABǫ
)VH+ ]N
.
Furthermore, we can bound N1(ǫ,H,DZ ) by Proposition B.2, which together with Lemma 5.9
yields a bound for (5.54)
N1
(
2R˜max(1 +γ )ǫ,LH,Z1:T
)
≤ eN+1(VH+ +1)N+1(AB)NVH+Q(N+1)VH+max
(
2e
ǫ
)(N+1)VH+
,
which completes the proof by replacing 2R˜max(1 +γ )ǫ by ǫ.
By choosing C1 as
C1 = 16 · eN+1(VH+ +1)N+1(AB)NVH+Q(N+1)VH+max
[
64 · eR˜max(1 +γ )
](N+1)VH+
,
and applying Lemma 5.8, we boundN1(ǫ/16,LH, (Z ′t ; t ∈H)) as
N1(ǫ/16,LH, (Z ′t ; t ∈H)) ≤
C1
16
(
1
ǫ
)V
,
where V = (N + 1)VH+ . Further, choosing C2 = 1/(2048 · R˜4max), we obtain P0 < δ by Lemma 5.5. In
particular, ΛT can be written as ΛT = K1 +K2 ·N , with
K1 = K1
(
VH+ log(T ), log(1/δ), log(R˜max),VH+ log(β)
)
,
K2 = K2
(
VH+ log(T ),VH+ log(β),VH+ log[R˜max(1 +γ )],VH+ log(Qmax),VH+ log(AB)
)
,
being some constants that depend on the parameters in the brackets. This concludes the proof.
5.5 Proof of Corollary 4.13
Proof. The proof proceeds by controlling the three error terms in the bound (except the inherent
approximation error) in Theorems 4.5 and 4.8 by ǫ/3 for any ǫ > 0. In particular, to show the first
argument for the cooperative setting, letting
4
√
2 ·Qmax
(1−γ )2 ·γ
K/2 ≤ 4
√
2 ·Qmax
(1−γ )2 ·
(1−γ )2ǫ
12
√
2 ·Qmax
=
ǫ
3
,
we immediately obtain that K is linear in log(1/ǫ), log[1/(1 − γ )], and log(Qmax). Letting the
estimation error be controlled by ǫ/3, we have
CMDPµ,ν ·
{
ΛT (δ/K)[ΛT (δ/K)/b∨ 1]1/ζ
T /(2048 · R˜4max)
}1/4
=
4γ ·
(
φMDPµ,ν
)1/2
√
2(1−γ )2
·
{
ΛT (δ/K)[ΛT (δ/K)/b∨ 1]1/ζ
T /(2048 · R˜4max)
}1/4
≤ ǫ
3
.
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By definition of ΛT in Theorem 4.5, we obtain that T is polynomial in 1/ǫ, γ/(1 − γ ), 1/R˜max,
log(1/δ), log(β), and N log(A). As for the decentralized computation error, let
√
2γ ·CMDPµ,ν · ǫ +
2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫK =
√
2γ ·
4γ ·
(
φMDPµ,ν
)1/2
√
2(1−γ )2
· ǫ + 2
√
2γ
1−γ · ǫK ≤
ǫ
3
. (5.55)
Note that under Assumptions 4.11 and 4.12, we can apply Lemma B.3, which shows that there
exist constants λ ∈ [0,1) and C3 > 0, such that at each iteration k of Algorithm 1√∑
i∈N
‖θik,l −θ∗k‖2 ≤ C3 ·λl , (5.56)
where θ∗k corresponds to the exact solution to (3.1) at this iteration k, i.e., Q˜k = (θ
∗
k)
⊤ϕ, and θik,l
represents the estimate of θ∗k of agent i at iteration l of Algorithm 2. Thus, if Algorithm 2 ter-
minates after L iterations, we have Q˜ik = (θ
i
k,L)
⊤ϕ, where recall that Q˜ik denotes the output of the
decentralized optimization step in Algorithm 1. Since the features ϕ are uniformly bounded, we
obtain from (5.56) that there exists a constant C4 > 0, such that for any (s,a) ∈ S ×A√
1
N
∑
i∈N
|Q˜ik(s,a)− Q˜k(s,a)|2 ≤ C4
√
1
N
∑
i∈N
‖θik,L −θ∗k‖2 ≤
C4C3√
N
·λL.
Thus, we can choose C4C3/
√
N · λL to bound the decentralized computation error ǫk . These ar-
guments apply to all iterations k ∈ [K], which means that we can bound both ǫ = max0≤k≤K−1 ǫk
and ǫK in (5.55) by C5 · λL for some constant C5 > 0. Therefore, we conclude from (5.55) that
the number of iterations L is linear in log(1/ǫ), log[γ/(1− γ )]. The arguments above also hold for
the terms of the bound in Theorem 4.8, except that for T , the dependence on N log(A) changes to
N log(AB). This completes the proof.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a finite-sample analysis for decentralized multi-agent reinforcement
learning. Specifically, we considered both the cooperative and competitive MARL settings. In the
cooperative setting, a team of heterogeneous agents connected by a time-varying communication
network aim to maximize the globally averaged return of all agents, with no existence of any
central controller. In the competitive setting, two teams of such decentralized RL agents form a
zero-sum Markov game. Our settings cover several conventional MARL settings as special cases,
e.g., the conventional cooperative MARL with a common reward function for all agents, and the
competitive MARL that is usually modeled as a two-player zero-sum Markov game.
In both settings, we proposed fitted-Q iteration-based MARL algorithms, with the aid of de-
centralized optimization algorithms to solve the fitting problem at each iteration. We quantified
the performance bound of the output action-value, using finite number of samples drawn from
a single RL trajectory. In addition, with linear function approximation, we further derived the
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performance bound after finite number of iterations of decentralized computation. To our knowl-
edge, these are the first finite-sample analysis for multi-agent RL, in either the cooperative or the
competitive setting. We believe these theoretical results provide some insights into the fundamen-
tal performance of MARL algorithms implemented with finite samples and finite computation
iterations in practice. One interesting future direction is to extend the finite-sample analysis to
more general MARL settings, e.g., general-sumMarkov games. It is also promising to sharpen the
bounds we obtained, in order to better understand and improve both the sample and computation
efficiency of MARL algorithms.
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A Definitions
In this section, we provide the detailed definitions of some terms used in the main text for the
sake of completeness.
We first give the definition of β-mixing of a stochastic process mentioned in Assumption 4.2.
DefinitionA.1 (β-mixing). Let {Zt}t=1,2,··· be a stochastic process, and denote the collection of (Z1, · · · ,Zt)
by Z1:t . Let σ(Z i:j ) denote the σ-algebra generated by Z i:j . The m-th β-mixing coefficient of {Zt}, de-
noted by βm, is defined as
βm = sup
t≥1
E
[
sup
B∈σ(Z t+m:∞)
∣∣∣P(B |Z1:t)−P(B)∣∣∣].
Then, {Zt} is said to be β-mixing if βm → 0 as m→∞. In particular, we say that a β-mixing process
mixes at an exponential rate with parameters β,g,ζ > 0 if βm ≤ β · exp(−gmζ) holds for all m ≥ 0.
We then provide the formal definitions of concentrability coefficients as inMunos and Szepesva´ri
(2008); Perolat et al. (2015), for networked multi-agent MDPs and team zero-sum Markov games,
respectively, used in Assumption 4.3.
Definition A.2 (Concentrability Coefficient for Networked Multi-agent MDPs). Let ν1,ν2 ∈ P (S ×
A) be two probability measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on
S ×A. Let {πt} be a sequence of joint policies for all the agents in the networked multi-agent MDP, with
πt : S → P (A) for all t. Suppose the initial state-action pair (s0,a0) has distribution ν1, and the action
at is sampled from the joint policy πt . For any integerm, we denote by PπmPπm−1 · · ·Pπ1ν1 the distribution
of (sm,am) under the policy sequence {πt}t=1,··· ,m. Then, the m-th concentration coefficient is defined as
κMDP(m;ν1,ν2) = sup
π1,...,πm
[
Eν2
∣∣∣∣∣d(PπmPπm−1 · · ·Pπ1ν1)dν2
∣∣∣∣∣2]1/2,
where d(PπmPπm−1 · · ·Pπ1ν1)/dν2 is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of PπmPπm−1 · · ·Pπ1ν1 with respect to
ν2, and the supremum is taken over all possible joint policy sequences {πt}t=1,··· ,m.
Definition A.3 (Concentrability Coefficient for Zero-sumMarkov Games). Let ν1,ν2 ∈ P (S×A×B)
be two probability measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on
S × A × B. Let {(πt ,σt)} be a sequence of joint policies for all the agents in the networked zero-sum
Markov game, with πt : S → P (A) and σt : S → P (B) for all t. Suppose the initial state-action pair
(s0,a0,b0) has distribution ν1, and the action at and bt are sampled from the joint policy πt and σt,
respectively. For any integer m, we denote by Pπm,σmPπm−1,σm−1 · · ·Pπ1,σ1ν1 the distribution of (sm,am,bm)
under the policy sequence {(πt ,σt)}t=1,··· ,m. Then, the m-th concentration coefficient is defined as
κMG(m;ν1,ν2) = sup
π1,σ1,...,πm,σm
[
Eν2
∣∣∣∣∣d(Pπm,σmPπm−1,σm−1 · · ·Pπ1,σ1ν1)dν2
∣∣∣∣∣2]1/2,
where d(Pπm,σmPπm−1,σm−1 · · ·Pπ1,σ1ν1)/dν2 is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Pπm,σmPπm−1,σm−1 · · ·Pπ1,σ1ν1
with respect to ν2, and the supremum is taken over all possible joint policy sequences {(πt ,σt)}t=1,··· ,m.
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To characterize the capacity of function classes, we define the (empirical) covering numbers of
a function class, following the definition in Antos et al. (2008b).
Definition A.4 (Definition 3 in Antos et al. (2008b)). For any fixed ǫ > 0, and a pseudo metric space
M = (M,d)6, we say that M is covered by m discs D1, · · · ,Dm if M ⊂
⋃
jDj . We define the covering
numberNc(ǫ,M,d) ofM as the smallest integer m such thatM can be covered bym discs each of which
having a radius less than ǫ. In particular, for a class H of real-valued functions with domain X and
points x1:T = (x1, · · · ,xT ) in X , the empirical covering number is defined as the covering number of H
equipped with the empirical ℓ1 pseudo metric,
lx1:T (f ,g) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
d
(
f (xt), g(xt)
)
, for any f ,g ∈ H
where d is a distance function on the range of functions in H. When this range is the reals, we use
d(a,b) = |a− b|. For brevity, we denote Nc(ǫ,H, lx1:T ) by N1(ǫ,H,x1:T ).
6A pseudo-metric satisfies all the properties of a metric except that the requirement of distinguishability is removed.
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B Auxiliary Results
In this section, we present several auxiliary results used previously and some of their proofs.
Lemma B.1 (Sum of Rank-1 Matrices). Suppose there are T vectors {ϕt}t=1,··· ,T with ϕt ∈ Rd and
d ≤ T , and the matrix [ϕ1, · · · ,ϕT ]⊤ has full column-rank, i.e., rank d. LetM = T −1 ·
∑T
t=1ϕtϕ
⊤
t . Then,
the matrixM is full-rank, i.e., has rank-d.
Proof. Since the matrix [ϕ1, · · · ,ϕT ]⊤ has full column-rank, there exists at least one subset of d
vectors {ϕt1 , · · · ,ϕtd }, such that these d vectors are linearly independent. Let Id = {t1, · · · , td }. Con-
sider a matrix M˜ = T −1 ·∑di=1ϕtiϕ⊤ti . Now we show that M˜ is full rank. Consider a nonzero v1 ∈ Rd
such that v1 ∈ span{ϕt2 , · · · ,ϕtd }; then M˜v1 = T −1 · ϕt1(ϕ⊤t1v1) is a nonzero scalar multiple of ϕt1.
Otherwise, v1 is also orthogonal to ϕt1 . Then, all ϕti for i = 1, · · · ,d are in the orthogonal space of
v1, which is of dimension d − 1. This contradicts the fact that the d vectors {ϕt1 , · · · ,ϕtd } are lin-
early independent. This way, we can construct nonzero scalar multiples of all ϕti for i = 1, · · · ,d,
say {v1, · · · ,vd }, which are linearly independent and all lie in the range space of M˜. Hence M˜ is
full-rank, with the smallest eigenvalue λmin(M˜) > 0.
In addition, for any tj ∈ [T ] but tj < Id , it holds that λmin(M˜+T −1 ·ϕtjϕ⊤tj ) ≥ λmin(M˜), since for
any x ∈ Rd , x⊤M˜x + T −1 · (x⊤ϕtj )2 ≥ x⊤M˜x. Therefore, M˜ + T −1 ·ϕtjϕ⊤tj is also full-rank, and so is
the matrixM, which completes the proof.
Lemma B.1 can be used directly to show that with a rich enough data setD = {(st ,at)}t=1,··· ,T , the
matrix MMDP defined in Assumption 4.11 is full rank. This argument also applies to the matrix
MMG, and can be used to justify the rationale behind Assumption 4.11.
We have the following proposition to bound the empirical covering number of a function class
using its pseudo-dimension. The proof of the proposition can be found in the proof of (Haussler,
1995, Corollary 3).
Proposition B.2 (Haussler (1995), Corollary 3). For any set X , any points x1:T ∈ X T , any class H of
functions on X taking values in [0,K] with pseudo-dimention VH+ <∞, and any ǫ > 0, then
N1(ǫ,H,x1:T ) ≤ e(VH+ +1)
(
2eK
ǫ
)VH+
.
For distributed optimizationwith strongly convex objectives, the following lemma fromNedic et al.
(2017) characterizes the geometric convergence rate of theDIGing algorithm (see Algorithm 2) un-
der time-varying communication networks. Lemma B.3 is used in the proof of Corollaries 4.13.
Lemma B.3 (Nedic et al. (2017), Theorem 10). Consider the decentralized optimization problem
min
x
N∑
i=1
fi(x), (B.1)
where for each i ∈ [N ], fi : Rp →R is differentiable, µi-strongly convex, and has Li-Lipschitz continuous
gradients. Suppose Assumption 4.12 on the consensus matrix C holds, recall that δ,B are the parameters
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in the assumption, then there exists a constant λ = λ(χ,B,N,L,µ) ∈ [0,1), where µ = N−1 ·∑Ni=1µi and
L =maxi∈[N ]Li , such that the sequence of matrices {[x1l , · · · ,xNl ]⊤} generated by DIGing algorithm along
iterations l = 0,1, · · · , converges to the matrix x∗ = 1(x∗)⊤, where x∗ is the unique solution to (B.1), at a
geometric rate O(λl).
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Proof. First consider N = 1, i.e., Q = Q1 ∈ H. Let {Qj }l∈[N1(ǫ′ ,H,Dy )] be the ǫ′-covering of H(Dy)
for some ǫ′ > 0. Recall that A = {a1, · · · ,aA}. Now we show that {maxa∈AQl(·,a)}l∈[N1(ǫ′ ,H,Dy )] is a
covering ofH∨1 .
Since for any Q1, there exists an l ′ ∈ [N1(ǫ′ ,H,Dy)] such that
1
AT
T∑
t=1
A∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣Q1(yt ,aj )−Ql ′ (yt ,aj )∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ′ .
Let ǫ′ = ǫ/A and aQt ∈ argmaxa∈A |Q1(yt ,a)−Ql ′ (yt ,a)|, we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣max
a∈A
Q1(yt ,a)−max
a∈A
Ql ′ (yt ,a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1T
T∑
t=1
max
a∈A
∣∣∣∣Q1(yt ,a)−Ql ′ (yt ,a)∣∣∣∣
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣Q1(yt ,aQt )−Ql ′ (yt ,aQt )∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1T
T∑
t=1
A∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣Q1(yt ,aj )−Ql ′ (yt ,aj )∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫA ·A = ǫ,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that
|Q1(yt ,aQt )−Ql ′ (yt ,aQt )| ≤
A∑
j=1
|Q1(yt ,aj )−Ql ′ (yt ,aj )|.
This shows that N1(ǫ,H∨1 ,yZ ) ≤ N1(ǫ/A,H,Dy). Moreover, since functions in H∨N are averages of
functions from N H∨1 , we have
N1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) ≤
[
N1(ǫ,H∨1 ,yZ )
]N ≤ [N1(ǫ/A,H,Dy )]N .
On the other hand, by Corollary 3 in Haussler (1995) (see also Proposition B.2 in §B), we can
boundN1(ǫ/A,H,Dy ) by the pseudo-dimension ofH, i.e.,
N1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) ≤
[
e(VH+ +1)
(
2eQmaxA
ǫ
)VH+ ]N
,
which concludes the proof.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 5.9
Proof. The proof is similar to that in B.2 for Lemma 5.4. Let {Ql }l∈[N1(ǫ′ ,H,Dy )] be the ǫ′-covering of
H(Dy) for some ǫ′ > 0. Then we claim that{
max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Ql(·,a′ ,b′)]
}
l∈[N1(ǫ′ ,H,Dy )]
covers H∨1 . By definition, for any Q1,1 ∈ H, there exists l ′ ∈ [N1(ǫ′ ,H,Dy )] such that
1
ABT
T∑
t=1
A∑
j=1
B∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣Q1,1(yt ,aj ,bk)−Ql ′ (yt ,aj ,bk)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ′ .
Let (π
Q
t ,σ
Q
t ) be the strategy pair given yt such that
max
π′∈P (A),σ ′∈P (B)
∣∣∣∣Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Q1,1(yt ,a′ ,b′)]−Eπ′,σ ′ [Ql ′ (yt ,a′ ,b′)]∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣EπQt ,σQt [Q1,1(yt ,a′ ,b′)]−EπQt ,σQt [Ql ′ (yt ,a′ ,b′)]∣∣∣∣.
Then, let ǫ′ = ǫ/(AB), we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣ max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Q
1,1(yt ,a
′ ,b′)]− max
π′∈P (A)
min
σ ′∈P (B)
Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Ql ′ (yt ,a
′ ,b′)]
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
max
π′∈P (A),σ ′∈P (B)
∣∣∣∣Eπ′ ,σ ′ [Q1,1(yt ,a′ ,b′)]−Eπ′,σ ′ [Ql ′ (yt ,a′ ,b′)]∣∣∣∣
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣EπQt ,σQt [Q1,1(yt ,a′ ,b′)]−EπQt ,σQt [Ql ′ (yt ,a′ ,b′)]∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
Eπ
Q
t ,σ
Q
t
∣∣∣∣Q1,1(yt ,a′ ,b′)−Ql ′ (yt ,a′ ,b′)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫAB · (AB) = ǫ.
Thus, by the relation between H∨N andH∨1 , and Proposition B.2, we further obtain
N1(ǫ,H∨N ,yZ ) ≤
[
N1(ǫ/(AB),H,Dy )
]N ≤ [e(VH+ +1)(2eQmaxABǫ
)VH+ ]N
,
which concludes the proof.
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